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PRIVACY AND COMMON LAW NAMES:  
SAND IN THE GEARS OF IDENTIFICATION 
Adam Candeub* 
Abstract 
During the last two decades, law and regulation have expanded to 
require real name identification in virtually every aspect of life—from 
online purchases to healthcare. This slow, subtle transformation has 
rendered a de facto nullity the Constitution’s anonymity protection 
against compelled identity disclosure. This evolution also has rendered 
impracticable the traditional, but mostly forgotten, common law rights to 
use whatever name one wishes—the de facto right to pseudonymity. This 
common law right facilitates anonymity, which, in turn, facilitates 
privacy.  
This Article argues that the continued vitality of common law name 
rights, particularly in light of recent First Amendment jurisprudence, 
establishes a right to pseudonymity. This right includes, in certain 
circumstances, the ability to demand a government-issued identification 
under a common law pseudonym. This ability would allow individuals to 
frustrate regulatory identification regimes and regain some privacy. 
Beyond these practical implications, this Article, employing the classic 
property–liability distinction, demonstrates how name governance 
changed from the common law liability regime to a government-owned 
property regime. This shift reflects an important, and hitherto 
unrecognized, transformation in the legal relationship between the state 
and citizen. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Not so long ago, Americans led private lives. The Official Preppy 
Handbook, the 1980 satirical Bible of the white Protestant East Coast 
elite,1 instructs, “You should appear in print only three times in your 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See Motoko Rich, Rejoice, Muffy and Biff: A Preppy Primer Revisited, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/books/04preppy.html.  
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life—upon birth, marriage, and death.”2 In 2000, however, Sun 
Microsystems Inc. CEO Scott McNealy declared that people “have zero 
privacy anyway” and to “[g]et over it.”3 But a disgruntled preppy might 
ask—discreetly, of course—“Who killed it?” Who or what is responsible 
for the major cultural shift? 
Many claim technology is to blame. Google, cell phone tracking, mass 
storage of telephone and internet metadata, mass video surveillance, and 
cloud storage have made The Official Preppy Handbook’s guidelines 
quaint, if not absurd. The hacked naked photographs of celebrities 
Jennifer Lawrence, Kim Kardashian, Rihanna, Vanessa Hudgens, and 
Kate Upton illustrate this cruel reality.4 
Even the Supreme Court accepts the conventional narrative that 
technology is privacy’s greatest slayer. In its most noteworthy recent 
privacy and technology decisions, Kyllo v. United States5 and United 
States v. Jones,6 the Court claimed that its goal is to protect against the 
“power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”7  
This Article argues that law, along with technology, has undermined 
privacy. Specifically, the law of identification has diminished privacy by 
requiring that individuals use government-issued identification in their 
everyday transactions. In the last few decades, and particularly since the 
passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005,8 most everything people do is 
subject to identification and subsequent recordation—from opening a 
bank account or applying for a credit card to receiving healthcare, buying 
alcohol, or taking an Amtrak train. Cash transactions under $10,000 are 
probably the only remaining safe harbor.9  
                                                                                                                     
 2. LISA BIRNBACH, THE OFFICIAL PREPPY HANDBOOK 25 (1980). 
 3. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It’, WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999), 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
 4. See Stephanie Marcus, Kim Kardashian’s Alleged Nude Photos Leak Online, Many 
More Celebs Targeted in Hacking Ring (UPDATE), HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 22, 2014, 9:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/20/kim-kardashian-nude-photo-leak_n_5854634.html 
(discussing the hacked photographs of Kim Kardashian, Vanessa Hudgens, and Rihanna); Alana 
Horowitz Satlin & Stephanie Marcus, Jennifer Lawrence’s Nude Photos Leak Online, Other 
Celebs Targeted, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 2, 2014, 12:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/08/31/jennifer-lawrence-nude-photos_n_5745260.html (discussing the hacked photographs 
of Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, Ariana Grande, and Victoria Justice).  
 5. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
 6. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 7. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; accord Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (“In circumstances involving 
dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”). 
 8. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 9. See Filing Obligations for Reports of Transactions in Currency, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 
(2015).  
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The law of identification makes transactions easily attributable to 
individuals, thereby rendering anonymity and privacy more difficult. 
Using a false or different name or identity—pseudonymity—to conceal 
information about oneself is one of the oldest and most powerful ways 
people hide their identities and retain privacy for the various aspects of 
their lives. Female authors, such as Jane Austen10 and Mary Ann Evans,11 
used pseudonymity to preserve their reputation in other spheres of life. 
Political figures also chose to utilize this tool, such as when James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay used the name “Publius” 
when publishing the Federalist Papers.12 In the landmark case of NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the First 
Amendment protects anonymity and pseudonymity—the right against 
compelled self-identification.14 Indeed, celebrities continue to rely on the 
pseudonymity strategy, with Tom Hanks using the name “Harry Lauder” 
or “Johnny Madrid,” Tobey Maguire taking “Neil Deep,” and Sarah 
Michelle Gellar adopting “Neely O’Hara,” the name of a character from 
the novel Valley of the Dolls.15  
Many European countries use, or are beginning to experiment with, 
official pseudonymous names and numbers in their identification 
systems.16 Pseudonymity has particular power online and particular 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See Laura Boyle, Sense and Sensibility: An Overview, JANE AUSTEN CTR. (July 17, 
2011), http://www.janeausten.co.uk/sense-and-sensibility-an-overview/.  
 11. Robyn Wagner, Comment, Don’t Shoot the Messenger: Limiting the Liability of 
Anonymous Remailer Operators, 32 N.M. L. REV. 99, 103 n.19 (2002) (noting that many famous 
authors used pseudonyms, including “Mark Twain (Samuel Langhorne Clemens), O. Henry 
(William Sydney Porter), Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet), George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans), and 
Charles Dickens (sometimes writing as ‘Boz’)”). 
 12. J. Michael Martinez & William D. Richardson, The Federalist Papers and Legal 
Interpretation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 307, 311–12 n.8 (2000). 
 13. 357 U.S. 449 (1958), remanded to 109 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1959), rev’d, 360 U.S. 240 
(1959), remanded to 122 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 1960). 
 14. Id. at 462 (“Inviolability of privacy . . . may in many circumstances be indispensable to 
preservation of freedom of association . . . .”). 
 15. Linda Ge, Sony Hack Exposes Celebrity Aliases for Tom Hanks, Jude Law, Natalie 
Portman and More in Latest Leak, WRAP (Dec. 8, 2014, 7:54 PM), http://www.thewrap.com/ 
sony-hack-exposes-celebrity-aliases-for-tom-hanks-jude-law-natalie-portman-and-more-in-
latest-leak/. 
 16. E.g., Niels Vandezande, Identification Numbers as Pseudonyms in the EU Public 
Sector, 2 EUR. J. L. & TECH., no. 2, 2011, at 1, 12 (discussing EU Member States’ use of 
identification numbers as pseudonyms “for the purpose of identifying their citizens in the public 
sector”); see also EUR. CENT. BANK, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF INTERNET 
PAYMENTS 3 (2013), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/recommendationssecurityinternet
paymentsoutcomeofpcfinalversionafterpc201301en.pdf (suggesting identification numbers as 
indicators of a strong customer authentication procedure for internet payments). 
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importance given the migration of everyday life to the cloud.17 If data is 
associated with a pseudonym, then unauthorized release or even 
sophisticated techniques such as “de-anonymization” of personal data, 
cannot reveal identity.18  
Most important, the de facto prohibition of pseudonymity is recent in 
U.S. law.19 For most of U.S. history, individuals could use their “common 
law name,” i.e., any name they chose for any reason absent fraud.20 
Individuals could use common law names to make contracts, get married, 
enter into secured transactions, and open bank accounts—everything 
required in business and in life. Coupled with a liberal, decentralized 
government registration scheme, Americans could go through life 
pseudonymously, and thus anonymously, free from constant 
identification demands.21  
This Article examines in detail how the law enabled the emergence of 
an all-encompassing mandatory identification system that rendered 
common law names obsolete. The process began in the 1930s with the 
expansion of government social welfare programs and grew in 
subsequent years with the social security number (SSN) becoming a 
standard identifier in government.22 The SSN also became a standard 
identifier in private areas such as banking, accelerated by the REAL ID 
Act of 200523, a statute passed in light of 9/11 concerns.24 
                                                                                                                     
 17.  See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, Pseudonyms, Trolls and the Battle over Online Identity, 
GIGAOM (Jan. 10, 2012, 9:40 AM), https://gigaom.com/2012/01/10/pseudonyms-trolls-and-the-
battle-over-online-identity/ (discussing the effects of pseudnoymity on commentary throughout 
the Internet). 
 18. See Gábor Gy. Gulyás & Sándor Imre, Analysis of Identity Separation Against a Passive 
Clique-Based De-anonymization Attack, INFOCOMMUNICATIONS J., Dec. 2011 11, 12–13, 19. 
 19. See infra Part II.  
 20. See Julia Shear Kushner, Comment, The Right to Control One’s Name, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 313, 316 (2009).  
 21. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and the Law in the United States, in 
LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED 
SOCIETY 441, 442 (Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the decentralized private law regulation 
of anonymity).  
 22. See Historical Development, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. 1–2, 
https://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/histdev.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).  
 23. See, e.g., REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 302, 312 (2005) 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2012)) (requiring state driver’s licenses to include an 
individual’s full legal name for federal recognition); see also infra Part II. “REAL ID implements 
a 9/11 Commission recommendation urging the federal government to ‘set standards for the 
issuance of sources of identification, such as driver's licenses.’” REAL ID Frequently Asked 
Questions for the Public, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/real-id-public-faqs (last 
updated Aug. 19, 2015) [hereinafter Real ID FAQ]. 
 24. See REAL ID Enforcement in Brief, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/real-id-enforcement-brief (last updated Jan. 8, 2016). 
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The emergence of an endemic, mandatory identification system alters 
a key legal distinction. The First Amendment does not protect the right 
to be anonymous but rather the right to be free from government-
compelled disclosure of identity.25 An internet service provider (ISP) 
must disclose the identity of an “anonymous” poster if served with a 
subpoena,26 but the state of Alabama cannot compel citizens to reveal 
their identity on their political leaflets.27 Mandatory identification 
undermines this distinction because it compels one to reveal one’s 
identity all the time: from PayPal and credit card purchases to obtaining 
a prescription for cold medicine or buying alcohol.  
This Article, in a novel analysis, examines the growing, unresolved 
tensions in case law concerning common law names. As the REAL ID 
requirements kick in,28 courts increasingly face the question of whether 
individuals can demand government-issued identification under their 
common law names. This Article argues that the common law right and 
the need for privacy give individuals that power. The government lacks a 
legitimate interest in a universal identification scheme, as opposed to 
schemes with limited function, such as the SSN’s anti-fraud purpose.29  
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, this Article adds to the debates 
about the nature of privacy.30 This Article argues for a shift from privacy 
law scholarship’s emphasis on defining privacy and arguing its normative 
or moral dimensions. Instead, this Article underscores the importance of 
how individuals gain privacy in the informational age, i.e., what legal 
tools people can use to prevent data-mining and de-anonymization. Last, 
this Article engages in a theoretical analysis of naming, relying on the 
familiar property–liability rule distinction of Professors Guido Calabresi 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 
150, 160, 165–66 (2002) (declaring unconstitutional an ordinance that required registration of 
those going door-to-door distributing religious printed materials); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional 
Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 200 (1999) (“Colorado’s current badge requirement discourages 
participation in the petition circulation process by forcing name identification . . . .”); McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 336, 357 (1995) (striking down an Ohio law that 
prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature). 
 26. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 27. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958), remanded to 109 
So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1959), rev’d, 360 U.S. 240 (1959), remanded to 122 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 1960). 
 28. Jim Harper, REAL ID: State-by-State Update, 749 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 2 
(2014), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa749_web_1.pdf. 
 29.  See infra Section III.C. This Article’s defense of common law names to facilitate 
privacy is a proposal allied with other efforts to make personal information gathering more 
difficult and costly for government and corporation—and was particularly inspired by the work 
of Professors Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum. See FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, 
OBFUSCATION:  A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015). 
 30. See infra Part IV. 
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and A. Douglas Melamed.31 This Article shows that the common law 
naming regime constitutes a liability regime, while the current system of 
government-issued identification is a property regime where the 
government, in effect, owns and licenses names. This shift reflects an 
important, and hitherto unrecognized, change in the legal relationship 
between the state and citizen. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I of this Article describes the 
relationship among common law names, pseudonymity, and privacy. Part 
II then examines how the gradual expansion of the welfare state, 
combined with increasing regulation on ubiquitous and necessary 
industries such as banking and healthcare, has rendered pseudonymity or 
common law names impractical or illegal. Building on the existing 
regulation, the REAL ID Act has emerged as the necessary linchpin in a 
pervasive system of identification. Part III provides the first modern 
explication of how courts resolve the ongoing tension between a common 
law name and the variety of statutes that require the use of a formally 
recognized name. Part III concludes that the common law name, 
combined with the First Amendment, continues to give individuals in 
some circumstances the right to demand a government-issued 
identification under a pseudonym. Finally, using the Melamed–Calabresi 
framework, Part IV of this Article engages in a theoretical analysis of 
naming, examining how the shift from the common law liability regime 
to the current government-owned property regime reflects an 
unrecognized, dramatic change in the legal relationship between the state 
and citizen. 
I.  PSEUDONYMITY, MANDATORY IDENTIFICATION, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Pseudonymity is one of the oldest and most powerful ways to conceal 
identity and gain privacy; it creates privacy because actions are not 
associated with the “real” actor. The First Amendment recognizes the 
value of anonymous speech and protects it.32 The First Amendment does 
so because “to ensure a vibrant marketplace of ideas, some speakers must 
be allowed to withhold their identities to protect themselves from 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
 32. Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-mask Case Law 
to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 887–88 (2013) 
(“[It is] often recognize[d] that anonymity is a First Amendment right or a right closely entwined 
with free expression. . . . [T]here is a generally common understanding that anonymity is valuable 
and should in at least some circumstances be protected as a speech right or as an aspect of speech. 
Even before McIntyre, anonymity was thus recognized as a function that has a nexus with free 
expression, and as a medium for speech that otherwise would not be heard.”). 
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harassment and persecution.”33 Pseudonymity allows the anonymity to 
travel, purchase items, communicate, and conduct any activity without 
attribution. Anonymity, in turn, “permits people the fullest range of 
choice in personal and social development. . . . [and] protects people who 
engage in dissent, whistle-blowing, and other controversial activities that 
challenge, and ultimately strengthen, our institutions.”34 Indeed, many 
legal scholars use anonymity and pseudonymity interchangeably, 
concluding “pseudonymity is a subset of anonymity.”35 
Leading theorists of modern online communications recognize the 
importance of anonymity in building internet communities.36 Beyond 
anonymity’s freeing effect on speech that scholars have observed37 and 
have found problematic,38 pseudonymity can create new types of trust. 
Judith Donath sees pseudonymity as a “middle ground” where 
“pseudonymous identities . . . can provide both accountability and 
privacy.”39  
[Pseudonyms are] not a lack of integrity, but a feature of 
being an adaptable person in multiple, [separate] social 
contexts, understanding the varied mores of the different 
situations.  
. . . . 
[P]seudonyms, being local, resembled our physical world 
experience where time and space effectively carve out 
separate spheres of interaction. Using one’s real name 
online, on the other hand, collapses contexts, as everything 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Matthew Mazzotta, Note, Balancing Act: Finding Consensus on Standards for 
Unmasking Anonymous Internet Speakers, 51 B.C. L. REV. 833, 833 (2010). 
 34. JIM HARPER, IDENTITY CRISIS: HOW IDENTIFICATION IS OVERUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD 
90 (2006). 
 35. E.g., David G. Post, Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, 
Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in Cyberspace, 1996 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 154 (“[A] 
pseudonymous message is an anonymous message, containing no information about the ‘actual’ 
identity of the message originator . . . ‘banning anonymity’—effectively eliminates all 
pseudonymous messages as well.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Jason A. Martin & Anthony L. Fargo, Anonymity as a Legal Right: Where and 
Why It Matters, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 311, 331–32 (2015) (“[C]ommunicating anonymously can 
have a disinhibiting effect on the communicator, freeing that person from societal and individual 
limitations on expressing her thoughts.”). 
 37. E.g., id. 
 38. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, The Internet’s Anonymity Problem, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 50, 53 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 
2010). 
 39. Judith S. Donath, We Need Online Alter Egos Now More Than Ever, WIRED (Apr. 25, 
2014, 2:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/why-we-need-online-alter-egos-now-more-
than-ever/. 
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one has performed or written under that name can be quickly 
tied together through search.40 
This Article does not argue that pseudonymity can or should offer 
absolute privacy which would give online child pornographers, online 
stalkers, and terrorists complete anonymity. Rather, this Article argues 
that pseudonymity’s privacy is relative.41 If someone checks into a hotel 
under an assumed name and an acquaintance who works at the hotel 
recognizes that person, then that person’s privacy is destroyed. Similarly, 
consider a credit card issued to a person’s account but with another 
person’s name on it—a perfectly legal arrangement.42 The shopkeeper 
who takes the card may identify the person from her face, particularly if 
she lives in a small town, and certainly an FBI investigator looking at her 
credit card accounts would see the transaction. But to most store clerks, 
and all of the store’s records, she would be pseudonymous and her 
purchases, therefore, private. Again, she could be identified, but that 
would take effort and probably a subpoena. Pseudonymity permits 
privacy because it throws sand in the gears of the corporate and 
government mechanisms that identify and track U.S. citizens—it 
enhances obscurity, raising search costs.43 
Pseudonymity’s relative level of privacy is generally enough, 
provided the person seeking privacy is not engaging in illegal activities. 
Precisely where to draw the line is a political question, and as such this 
Article does not directly address the question. Instead, this Article 
concerns the legal mechanisms that allow or prohibit pseudonymity.  
But given the alleged “death of privacy,” can pseudonymity matter? 
The Internet as well as information and communication technologies 
have transformed the ability of government and industry to gather, search, 
and use information about citizens and consumers. The U.S. public is well 
aware of the litany of information-gathering techniques. License plate 
readers or electronic toll radio-frequency identification (RFID) can 
identify vehicles and their drivers through DMV databases, thereby 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. E.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND 
FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 131–32 (2014) (describing Julia Angwin’s 
adaptation of such a technique in her effort to live her life anonymously). 
 43. Cf. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62 (2009) (“Social 
networking sites and blogs have increasingly become breeding grounds for anonymous online 
groups that attack women, people of color, and members of other traditionally disadvantaged 
classes.”); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederick Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2013) (“[I]nformation is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors that are 
essential to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these factors: (1) search 
visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity. . . . Courts could use an 
obscurity continuum when determining if certain information is eligible for privacy protections.”). 
 
9
Candeub: Privacy and Common Law Names: Sand in the Gears of Identification
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
476 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
allowing the government to keep perfect track of individuals’ 
movements.44 Mobile telephone companies also can keep track of 
movements due to the geolocation necessary for cell phone 
communications, and the government can often obtain these phone 
records.45 Soon, drones may keep track of movements as well.46 Beyond 
physical movements, computer technology tracks commercial activity, 
including a person’s purchasing habits at the gas station, supermarket, 
and department stores.47 
Facebook records in detail data about its users’ social networks, 
disclosing how users arrange the informal aspects of their lives.48 Google 
and other search engines keep records of searches, as ISPs, such as 
Comcast, keep track of every site a person visits.49 While many people’s 
searches may be trivial, such as whether the local restaurant is open, 
others can reveal private medical information, major purchases, financial 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Devlin Barrett, U.S. Spies on Millions of Drivers: DEA Uses License-Plate Readers to 
Build Database for Federal, Local Authorities, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-spies-on-millions-of-cars-1422314779; Kashmir Hill, E-
ZPasses Get Read All Over New York (Not Just at Toll Booths), FORBES (Sept. 12, 2013, 
4:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/09/12/e-zpasses-get-read-all-over-new-
york-not-just-at-toll-booths/. 
 45. Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v. 
Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2012) (“Among existing (and likely also 
future) technologies, a great uncertainty exists as to whether the third-party doctrine will allow 
governments to compel production of user data—including location data—from third-party 
service providers without a warrant. Technologies subject to the doctrine’s reach include GPS 
devices installed in vehicles by either the owner or manufacturer, either voluntarily or through 
governmental mandate, as well as the increasingly ubiquitous GPS capabilities of smartphones, 
all of which involve a third party that provides the GPS service and collects the location data.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 46. Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming! Will the Fourth Amendment Stop Their Threat 
to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1279, 1312 (2013) (questioning potential limitations for 
outdoor drone surveillance). 
 47. Dustin D. Berger, Balancing Consumer Privacy with Behavioral Targeting, 27 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 3, 4–5 (2011) (“For some time, websites and Internet service 
providers (ISPs) have been compiling profiles about their customers. . . . And, many consumers 
would be understandably indignant at the detailed picture of their private lives that profilers 
possess regardless of how the profilers use the information.”). 
 48. MICHAEL LIEBERMAN, VISUALIZING BIG DATA: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 2 (2014), 
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.casro.org/resource/collection/E0F10496-BE87-48E8-8746-
521D403EE4A2/Paper_-_Michael_Lieberman_-_Multivariate_Solutions.pdf. 
 49. Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud Computing: 
Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341, 427–28 
(2013) (“Companies like Google and AT&T collect large amounts of personal user data from 
customers. This sort of information was formerly used for marketing and research purposes, but 
recently the U.S. government has been building national security databases that contain personal 
user data provided by cooperating telecommunications companies like AT&T.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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data, and even sexual desires.50 Beyond Google, which brags that it saves 
every search,51 the government is also keeping track. As with geolocation 
phone data, the government can easily subpoena information that Google 
or Comcast stores.52 And, as the Snowden revelations have shown, the 
government has gotten into the business big time.53 Its PRISM program 
warehouses huge amounts of internet data.54 
But, one should not underestimate the level of privacy that 
pseudonymity can provide. Few wish to have perfect privacy; most want 
just enough. For instance, a person could use a pseudonym to go to the 
doctor’s office without every clerical assistant and office manager or an 
insurance company knowing about it. Many might find this an important 
advantage in a small town, and it may in fact persuade a person to get 
treatment for an embarrassing ailment.  
Further, pseudonymity is a valuable weapon against the most 
technologically advanced tools working against privacy. Consider the 
concerns about “de-anonymizing data.” Many scholars have closely 
examined the legal and policy implications of de-anonymization.55 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Do These Google Searches Really Reveal Our Deepest Sexual 
Anxieties?, FUSION (Jan. 27, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://fusion.net/story/40541/google-searching-
our-sexual-shortcomings/; Jose Vilches, Managing Your Privacy Online: Search Engines, 
TECHSPOT (May 28, 2010), http://www.techspot.com/guides/281-manage-search-engine-
privacy/.  
 51. Frida Ghitis, Google Knows Too Much About You, CNN (Feb. 9, 2012, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/09/opinion/ghitis-google-privacy/. 
 52. Justin P. Murphy & Adrian Fontecilla, Social Media Evidence in Government 
Investigations and Criminal Proceedings: A Frontier of New Legal Issues, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 11–13 (2013) (“The SCA provides that non-content [electronic] records can be compelled 
through a warrant or court order. . . . ‘The government has three options for obtaining 
communications . . . that have been in electronic storage with an electronic service provider for 
more than 180 days: (1) obtain a warrant; (2) use an administrative subpoena; or (3) obtain a court 
order under § 2703(d).’” (quoting United States v. Warshak, 641 F.3d 266, 282 (6th Cir. 2010))). 
 53. See Steven R. Morrison, The System of Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement, 
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 341, 342 (2014). 
 54. See Michael Greene, Where Has Privacy Gone? How Surveillance Programs Threaten 
Expectations of Privacy, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 795, 802 (2014) 
(“PRISM . . . collects all foreign communications that pass through U.S. hubs.”); Ryan W. Neal, 
What Can the NSA See? MIT Immersion Project Illustrates Metadata PRISM Can Gather, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (July 10, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/what-can-nsa-see-mit-immersion-
project-illustrates-metadata-prism-can-gather-1340959. 
 55. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2014) (“Not only does 
Big Data’s use have the potential to circumvent existing antidiscrimination regulations, but it may 
also lead to privacy breaches in health care and law enforcement.”); Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy 
and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1121–22 (2013) (“In the Netflix example, as 
well as in other prominent examples, anonymization seems not to have worked as intended, and 
researchers have been able to ‘de-anonymize’ the data, thereby learning the information of 
particular individuals from the released data. These examples of de-anonymization have led some 
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Suppose an epidemiologist obtained data on all individuals receiving 
treatment for AIDS in a certain county in the United States; the 
individuals in the sample are identified by zip code, birth date, and sex. 
Privacy and computer researchers have found that those few nuggets of 
information often identify one unique individual who could be discovered 
with a few internet searches.56 In other words, large numbers of records 
about an individual likely exist that have been de-anonymized, which 
could easily be re-identified. 
Pseudonyms can protect a person against de-anonymization. Say a 
person obtains healthcare under a pseudonym with a birth date altered by 
one day; his anonymity and privacy would remain intact even if his 
private medical data were released and de-anonymized. In addition, the 
person’s privacy would be protected against casual snoopers in electronic 
medical records57 as well as the accidental loss of medical records—
apparently a growing problem.58  
In general, many claim that the data revolution makes obscurity 
impossible, or at least big data makes privacy through obscurity more 
difficult.59 Individuals cannot hide in the sheer mass of data when the 
                                                                                                                     
to argue that privacy and utility are fundamentally incompatible with each other and that 
supposedly anonymized data is never in fact anonymous.” (footnote omitted)). 
 56. Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705 (2010) (“How many other people in the United 
States share your specific combination of ZIP code, birth date (including year), and sex? 
According to a landmark study, for 87 percent of the American population, the answer is zero; 
these three pieces of information uniquely identify each of them.”); see also Paul M. Schwartz & 
Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable 
Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1877–78 (2011) (“At some point, a search allows a person 
to be readily identifiable.”); Latanya Sweeney, k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 
INT’L J. UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 557, 558–59 (2002) 
(“Combinations of few characteristics often combine in populations to uniquely . . . identify some 
individuals.”).  
 57. David Schultz, Medical Data Breaches Raising Alarm, WASH. POST (June 2, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/medical-data-breaches-raise-alarms/ 
2012/06/02/gJQAVPWt9U_story.html (“As more doctors and hospitals go digital with medical 
records, the size and frequency of data breaches are alarming privacy advocates and public health 
officials.”). 
 58. José Luis Fernández-Alemán et al., Security and Privacy in Electronic Health Records: 
A Systematic Literature Review, 46 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 541, 542 (2013). 
 59. E.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 81, 84 (2013) (“Maintaining obscurity will be even more difficult once big data tools, 
techniques, and datasets become further democratized and made available to the non-data-
scientist masses for free or at low cost. Given recent technological trends, this outcome seems to 
be gradually approaching inevitability.”); see also Ohm, supra note 56, at 1724 (noting the 
possibility of “combin[ing] anonymized data with outside information to pry out obscured 
identities”). But see Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 
(2011) (“[T]he influential legal scholarship by Ohm and others misinterprets the computer science 
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government or private entities can easily collect, correlate, and cross-
reference.60 But pseudonymity makes big data less threatening. One can 
use a pseudonym to ensure that information associated with that 
pseudonym (what she eats, what she buys, where she goes, what websites 
she visits) will not be associated with her. It throws sand in the gears of 
the identification mechanisms. 
Of course, anonymity and pseudonymity have costs.61 For instance, 
the pseudonymous patient faces inconvenience and possible danger due 
to medical mistakes resulting from the failure to integrate medical records 
under both names. However, that is a feature, not a bug. If individuals 
desire privacy, they must bear the cost. Most people probably would not 
care enough about privacy to incur the cost, but, for example, an 
individual with a socially stigmatizing venereal disease who lives in a 
small, conservative town might.  
In this way, pseudonymity can play a major role in throwing sand in 
the gears, as part of an arsenal of “self-help” privacy. To illustrate, 
journalist Julia Angwin wrote a book in which she describes her efforts 
to obtain privacy in today’s world.62 She obtained credit cards under her 
own account but a different name, used Tor—an anonymizing search 
engine that masks the identity and location of the user’s computer—and 
refused to use privacy-decreasing technologies.63 She did not want 
“perfect” privacy; rather, she just wanted to make it more difficult for the 
government, data-miners, or anyone else to collect and correlate 
information about her.64 
Perhaps most fundamentally, constant identification requirements 
eliminate First Amendment-protected anonymity.65 In the last decade, 
more and more activities in life—from PayPal transactions to receiving 
healthcare—require identification using a government-issued 
identification keyed to one’s SSN and reflecting one’s formal legal name, 
                                                                                                                     
literature, and as a result, oversells the futility of anonymization, even with respect to theoretical 
risk.”). 
 60. Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 
414 (2014) (“The growing adoption of big data and its ability to make extensive, often unexpected, 
secondary uses of personal data changes this calculus. As Kord Davis observed in his book Ethics 
of Big Data, ‘the potential for harm due to unintended consequences[] can quickly outweigh the 
value the big-data innovation is intended to provide.’” (quoting KORD DAVIS & DOUG PATTERSON, 
ETHICS OF BIG DATA 5 (Julie Steele & Courtney Nash eds., 2012))). 
 61. This is, of course, equally true on the Internet. For an interesting set of hitherto 
unidentified costs, see Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501, 503–04 
(2013) (“[P]reserving [anonymity] will increasingly come at the expense of another attribute 
[generativity] that is arguably more essential to the Internet’s exceptionalism.”). 
 62. ANGWIN, supra note 42, at 131–34. 
 63. Id. at 131–34, 188. 
 64. Id. at 127. 
 65. See infra Sections III.C–D. 
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and even bearing an RFID chip.66 If an activity requires government-
issued identification, then it cannot be done anonymously—and the 
distinction between compelled identification (protected by the First 
Amendment) and third-party revealing of identity (not protected) begins 
to evaporate.  
The Supreme Court has long held that the First Amendment prohibits 
restrictions on anonymous speech, meaning that the government cannot 
force speakers to identify themselves, particularly when engaging in 
political, religious, or other protected types of speech.67 For example, the 
Court consistently has ruled that the First Amendment prohibits laws 
requiring individuals engaged in protected speech to identify themselves. 
On the other hand, courts have held that people have no right to 
anonymous speech.68 When speakers identify themselves to ISPs, 
speakers have no right to demand that the ISP not disclose their 
identifying information.69 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See, e.g., Enhanced Drivers Licenses: What Are They?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/enhanced-drivers-licenses-what-are-they (last updated Aug. 20, 2015) 
(discussing the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and its recommendation of enhanced 
driver’s licenses). 
 67. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 160, 
166–67 (2002) (“For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions on door-to-door 
canvassing and pamphleteering.”), remanded to 42 Fed. App’x 772 (6th Cir. 2002); McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995), remanded to 650 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio 1995); 
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (“Persecuted groups and sects from time to time 
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously 
or not at all. . . . It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive 
purposes.”); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 199–200 (1999) 
(holding that the First Amendment prohibits a rule that petition circulators wear identification 
badges because it “compels . . . identification at the precise moment when the circulator’s interest 
in anonymity is greatest”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63, 466 
(1958) (ruling that state subpoenas seeking the names of NAACP members violate the First 
Amendment), remanded to 109 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1959), rev’d, 360 U.S. 240 (1959), remanded to 
122 So. 2d 396 (Ala. 1960). 
 68. See, e.g., First Time Videos, LLC v. Does 1–500, 276 F.R.D. 241, 248 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 69. Most courts apply a balancing test for when ISPs and other networks must reveal 
identities under civil subpoena. See Clay Calvert et al., David Doe v. Goliath, Inc.: Judicial 
Ferment in 2009 for Business Plaintiffs Seeking the Identities of Anonymous Online Speakers, 43 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 26 (2009) (“Courts today generally pay homage to the nation’s long 
history and tradition of protecting anonymous speech, as they tend to apply one of the more 
rigorous unmasking standards to cases of anonymous Internet speech . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
Of course, under the Stored Communications Act and the USA PATRIOT Act, the government 
has little if any barrier to obtaining metadata and must satisfy a relatively low bar to obtain the 
content of internet communications. Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy 
Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 385 (2014) (noting that under the Stored Communications Act, “the 
government must establish ‘specific and articulable facts’ to obtain a court order requiring the 
disclosure of many kinds of noncontent Internet records, such as the to-from addresses on emails” 
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The constant identification requirement in every aspect of life makes 
anonymity or pseudonymity impossible—or at least very difficult. After 
all, the activities that make speech possible—such as writing on the 
Internet or buying placards—force individuals to identify themselves.70 
Certain political or civil rights groups, such as the National Association 
of the Advancement of Colored People, have historically faced 
opposition by racist government officials; anonymity or pseudonymity 
could protect members and their speech even in a world of constant 
identification and surveillance.71 Because anonymity is no longer 
practicable, pseudonymity offers the best hope for anonymous speech. 
II.  HOW THE COMMON LAW NAME DIED  
Not too long ago, common law names gave individuals great latitude 
to use pseudonyms. As discussed below, the common law developed 
rules for how people could use multiple names to be bound by contract, 
receive inherited property, marry, and hold secured interests.  Even 
though legislatures never repealed common law names,72 pseudonymity 
                                                                                                                     
(quoting Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 
4279, 4292 (1994))). 
 70. The Internet is not anonymous in that Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are easily 
traceable to particular broadband lines. Since it is virtually impossible to buy one’s broadband 
connection anonymously, anonymity online is quite difficult. Anonymizer proxy servers such as 
Tor can provide some anonymity, but even they can be compromised. Dune Lawrence, The Inside 
Story of Tor, the Best Internet Anonymity Tool the Government Ever Built, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 
23, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-01-23/tor-anonymity-software-vs-dot-
the-national-security-agency; see also Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Untangling the 
Legal Labyrinth: Protections for Anonymous Online Speech, 13 J. INTERNET L. 1, 16 (2010) 
(“Legal process seeking the identity of an anonymous poster may arise in various ways. Most 
frequently, a plaintiff commences a lawsuit against a Jane or John Doe defendant and then moves 
for issuance of a preservice discovery subpoena on the owner of the Web site on which the 
offending material was posted, the anonymous poster’s Internet service provider (ISP), or 
both. . . . The subpoena typically requests ‘all identifying information’ regarding the poster and 
often identifies that person by the pseudonym under which he or she posted or by the date and 
time of the post. . . . Because many people register using fake names and non-descript email 
addresses, the IP address is often the most valuable piece of information sought.”). Courts 
generally apply a balancing test when forcing ISPs or others to “unmask” online actors. See 
Kissinger & Larsen, supra, at 19.  
 71. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462–63 (finding that “on past occasions revelation of the identity 
of [the NAACP’s] rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss 
of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility,” and that 
anonymity will help protect its members and their right to advocate their beliefs). 
 72. Leone v. Comm’r, Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 933 N.E.2d 1244, 1253 (Ind. 2010) 
(“All states have enacted similar statutes [providing a name change procedure], and all but two 
have concluded that they do not abrogate but instead supplement the common law.”); Kushner, 
supra note 20, 328–29 (noting that “[o]nly a few states have explicitly abrogated the common law 
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is either illegal or practically impossible in most aspects of life today. The 
mechanism by which common law names and pseudonymity have been 
eliminated involves a complicated interaction among consumer 
regulations, regulated industries, and the criminal law.  
First, a list of “true” names had to be created. In the United States, this 
was not an easy matter because, historically, the several states kept birth 
records; there was never a readily available national list.73 The lack of a 
national registry distinguished the United States from every other 
industrialized nation of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.74 The 
United States has developed such a list gradually, starting with the social 
security number (SSN) in the 1930s75 and culminating with the REAL ID 
Act of 2005, which finally developed a set of interconnected state 
databases, cross-referenced by SSNs, that can serve as the official 
“list”—at least for adults.76 
Second, there must be a mandate that individuals only use their 
“official” name. While never formally abandoning the common law 
name, the United States has created countless regulatory regimes that 
require the use of government-issued identification. This regulatory web 
of identification now extends from banking and healthcare to 
transportation and education.  
Third, law and regulation had to outlaw identification other than that 
with one’s official name—or more subtly, the government-issued 
identification can go “viral,” emerging as a sort of standard for all public 
and private transactions and interactions. Companies and other private 
entities no longer have to rely on their own methods of identification, as 
they did under common law regimes, but may piggyback onto the 
preexisting (and free) government regime.77  
Ancient common law prerogatives die slow deaths, most often in 
obscure places shielded from the light of day. Few legislators wish to be 
known for destroying individual rights. This Part discusses the common 
law name and registration system as it existed in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and how it transformed in the twentieth and twenty-
first century. 
 
                                                                                                                     
right,” while most states have enacted statutes regulating name-change procedures that 
supplement, rather than replace, the common law). 
 73. See infra Subsection II.B.1. 
 74. See infra Subsection II B.1.  
 75. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 76. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30301–30304 (2012). 
 77. In a prophetic article, Professor Michael Froomkin foresaw such a result. Michael 
Froomkin, Creating a Viral Federal Privacy Standard, 48 B.C. L. REV. 55, 84 (2007). 
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A.  The Common Law Name, National Registries, and the Unique 
American System of Identification 
Common law in England and the United States has always permitted 
common law names. An individual may choose any name he wishes—
provided the reasons for requesting the name change are not fraudulent.78 
This name is perfectly legal for all purposes. As a nineteenth-century 
authority states:  
 
It is a custom for persons to bear the surnames of their 
parents, but it is not obligatory. A man may lawfully 
change his name without resort to legal proceedings, and 
for all purposes the name thus assumed will constitute his 
legal name just as much as if he had borne it from birth.79  
 
                                                                                                                     
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 593 F.2d 46, 49 (6th Cir. 1979); Azeez v. Fairman, 604 
F. Supp. 357, 362 (C.D. Ill. 1985) (“The common law name change is valid, however, only if the 
change does not interfere with the rights of others by serving a fraudulent purpose.”), rev’d, 795 
F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. McKay, 2 F.2d 257, 259 (D. Nev. 1924); Christianson 
v. King County, 196 F. 791, 799 (W.D. Wash. 1912), aff’d, 203 F. 894 (9th Cir. 1913), aff’d, 239 
U.S. 356 (1915); Linton v. First Nat’l Bank, 10 F. 894, 899 n. (W.D. Pa. 1882); Carlisle v. 
People’s Bank, 26 So. 115, 116 (Ala. 1899); In re Arnett, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3 n.3 (Ct. App. 
2007); In re Marriage of Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258, 260 (Colo. App. 1983); Pease v. Pease, 35 Conn. 
131, 155 (1868); Reddick v. State, 5 So. 704, 706 (Fla. 1889); Parmelee v. Raymond, 43 Ill. App. 
609, 610 (1891); Graham v. Eiszner, 28 Ill. App. 269, 273 (1888); Clark v. Clark, 19 Kan. 522, 
524–25 (1878); Stuart v. Bd. of Supervisors, 295 A.2d 223, 226–27 (Md. 1972); Sec’y of the 
Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 366 N.E.2d 717, 721 (Mass. 1977); Hommel v. Devinney, 39 Mich. 
522, 524 (1878); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 247 N.W.2d 354, 355 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Coplin 
v. Woodmen of the World, 62 So. 7, 9 (Miss. 1913) (“At common law a man could change his 
name, in good faith, and for an honest purpose, and adopt a new one, by which he could be 
generally recognized.”); Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 385 A.2d 120, 122 (N.H. 1978); McGarvey v. 
Atlantic City, 8 A.2d 385, 387 (N.J. 1939) (“The common law does not prohibit the assumption 
of any name, unless for a fraudulent purpose, or unless inhibited by a statute or judicial 
adjudication.”); In re Pirlamarla, 504 A.2d 1238, 1240 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (“The 
common law permits an adult to change his or her name without leave of court simply by adopting 
a new name and utilizing it in the ordinary course of daily living.”); In re Halligan, 46 A.D.2d 
170, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (“Under the common law a person may change his or her name 
at will so long as there is no fraud, misrepresentation or interference with the rights of others.”); 
Eisenberg v. Strasser, 768 N.Y.S.2d 773, 776–77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003), aff’d but criticized by 763 
N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003), aff’d, 100 N.Y. 2d 590 (N.Y. 2003); Pierce v. Brushart, 92 
N.E.2d 4, 8 (Ohio 1950); Robinovitz v. Hamill, 144 P. 1024, 1025 (Okla. 1914) (“We are satisfied, 
therefore, that the plaintiff . . . had the right to assume any name under which he chose to conduct 
his business . . . in good faith, and that he had a right to maintain an action for breach of contracts 
made under such business name . . . .”); Gearing v. Carroll, 24 A. 1045, 1046 (Pa. 1892); Traugott 
v. Petit, 404 A.2d 77, 80 (R.I. 1979); Dunn v. Palermo, 522 S.W.2d 679, 688–89 (Tenn. 1975); 
Kruzel v. Podell, 226 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Wis. 1975). 
 79. Archibald H. Throckmorton, Names, in 29 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 261, 
271 (William Mack ed. 1908). 
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Similarly,  
 
At common law a man may lawfully change his name, or 
by general usage or habit acquire another name than that 
originally borne by him, and this without the intervention 
of either the sovereign, the courts, or Parliament; and the 
common-law rule, unless changed by statute, of course 
obtains in the United States.80 
 
Only four states have explicitly abrogated the common law right.81 
Authorities make clear that common law names need not be limited, 
i.e., a person could have more than one common law name at once.82 
Thus, common law names could function as perfect pseudonyms. 
Individuals could effortlessly assume different names in different aspects 
of their lives.  
Further, common law names were legally binding. Under a common 
law name, one could contract,83 convey property,84 be a beneficiary under 
an insurance contract,85 get married,86 inherit property,87 or be the 
beneficiary of a negotiable instrument.88 In short, common law names 
allowed for pseudonymity in virtually every aspect of life.  
                                                                                                                     
 80. Name, in 21 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 305, 311 (David S. 
Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1902). 
 81. Kushner, supra note 20, at 328–29 n.79 (noting that Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, and 
Oklahoma have abrogated the common law name). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348, 354 n.12 (9th Cir. 1977); Ming v. United 
States, 103 F.2d 355, 358 (9th Cir. 1939) (“[U]nder the English common law, one may properly 
have several names.”); Burke v. United States, 58 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir. 1932) (“[A]n individual, 
may have, or be known by, more than one name . . . .”); see also Hauser v. Callaway, 36 F.2d 667, 
669 (8th Cir. 1929) (noting that a person’s true name is the one that person is best known by in 
the community). 
 83. Schofield v. Jennings, 68 Ind. 232, 235 (1879) (“A person may be known by any name 
in which he may contract, and in such name he may sue and be sued, and by such name may be 
criminally punished; and when a person is known by several names—by one as well as another—
he may contract in either, and sue and be sued by the one in which he contracts, and may be 
punished criminally by either. And names which sound alike are held, in law, to be the same, 
though they may be spelled by different letters.”). 
 84. Wilson v. White, 24 P. 114, 115 (Cal. 1890) (“He may assume a name for the occasion; 
and a conveyance to and by him under such name will pass the title.”). 
 85. E.g., Everett v. Standard Accident Ins., 187 P. 996, 998–99 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1919). 
 86. Chipman v. Johnston, 130 N.E. 65, 66–67 (Mass. 1921). 
 87. See Christianson v. King County, 196 F. 791, 792–93, 799 (W.D. Wash. 1912), aff’d, 
203 F. 894 (9th Cir. 1913), aff’d, 239 U.S. 356 (1915) (“In any event, it is well established that a 
man may lawfully change his name, without resorting to legal proceedings, and for all purposes 
the name thus assumed by him will constitute his legal name . . . .”). 
 88. Seidman v. N. Camden Tr. Co., 7 A.2d 406, 408 (N.J. 1939) (“The early English cases 
which first formulated the rule that a bill payable to a fictitious person is by legal intendment 
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Most importantly, the law developed a system of liability rules to deal 
with common law names. To borrow Professors Melamed and 
Calabresi’s classic liability–property distinction,89 a name under common 
law was an entitlement protected by a liability. Anyone was entitled to 
use a name, but if one imposed costs on others, one had to pay the cost of 
using the name. Thus, under the common law, if one used a name for 
fraud, one had to pay the damages caused.90 
What is interesting and largely forgotten is that the common law 
developed fine-tuned liability rules for common law names and 
pseudonyms. For instance, there were rules for how to treat negotiable 
instruments made out to pseudonyms or nonexistent persons—they 
became payable to the bearer.91 Similarly, the identity of an individual 
insured under a pseudonym could be discerned through parol evidence.92 
Insurance contracts made under one name for the benefit of a person’s 
other name have been held valid, provided that “you can find it was his 
intention that he should be known by the name . . . and thereafter retain 
that name, if you should find that he had to this extent acquired that name, 
then this representation in the application would not be false.”93  Part IV 
explores more fully how the current naming regime has become a 
property entitlement regime.94  
 
                                                                                                                     
payable to bearer, and may be transferred without indorsement, clearly make the knowledge on 
the part of the drawer of the fictitious character of the payee a condition of the rule.”). 
 89. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31, at 1106–07. 
 90. People v. Porter, 288 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); State v. Fick, 464 P.2d 271, 
274 (Kan. 1970) (“In our view, defendant falsely made and forged the check. Under the 
circumstances attendant here, the writing of the Wells’s name on the check was 
false. . . . Defendant did not innocently assume the name of Wells, but opened the account in that 
name because he had Wells’s chauffeur’s license to use as a means of identification. Defendant 
purported to be someone he was not. He attempted to impersonate Darrell D. Wells. He made a 
deposit of $25, but then promptly proceeded to issue checks against the account, each of which 
was in an amount exceeding $25. All such conduct was steeped in fraud.”); State v. Lutes, 230 
P.2d 786, 789 (Wash. 1951) (“After adopting or assuming a name for an honest purpose, its 
use . . . would not constitute forgery, unless the person using the name falsely assumed it for the 
purpose and with the intent of perpetrating a fraud.”). 
 91. State v. Weigel, 477 A.2d 372, 377 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (“A check which 
is made payable to a fictitious or nonexistent person is treated as a check made payable to bearer 
when the maker of the check knows that the payee is either a fictitious or nonexistent person.”). 
 92. Wilson v. White, 24 P. 114, 115 (Cal. 1890) (“So, where a deed was made out in the 
name of ‘James O. Brunius,’ and signed, ‘J. O. BRUNIUS,’ it was held that parol evidence was 
admissible to show that John O. Brunius was the party who signed the deed, and that if this was 
proved his title passed.”). 
 93. Smith v. U.S. Cas. Co., 90 N.E. 947, 948 (N.Y. 1910). 
 94. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31, at 1092. 
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B.  Three Steps to Eliminate the Common Law Name 
As set forth above, destruction of the common law name involves 
three steps. First, a list of “true” names must be created. Second, law and 
regulation must develop mandates that individuals only use their “true” 
name. Third, law and regulation must make any identification bearing 
any name other than one’s official name illegal, and industry practice 
must require the use of government-issued identification, rendering 
pseudonymity impractical.  
1.  Step One: Creating a Centralized List of “True” Names in the United 
States  
The United States was unique from its very beginning in having a 
decentralized name registration, combined with a common law name rule 
that rendered any centralized naming registry an administrative 
impossibility.95 The several states established their own systems for 
registering births.96 As described below, it was not until the 1930s that 
the United States moved toward the European approach and a centralized 
naming system. 
Henry VIII instituted England’s first national institution of 
registration. Using his new power as head of the Church of England,97 he 
ordered parishes to keep records of births, deaths, and marriages.98 The 
registration lists were to be “a public, local, and civic record, deliberately 
created . . . for legal and economic purposes.”99 These purposes were 
primarily inheritance.100 Thomas Cromwell, Henry VIII’s vicar-general, 
explained the purpose of registration in the following terms: “for the 
avoiding of sundry strifes, processes and contentions arising from age, 
lineal descent, title of inheritance, legitimation of bastardy, and for 
knowledge whether any person is our subject or no.”101 The recording 
also played a role in government benefit distributions; the Poor Laws, 
                                                                                                                     
 95. HENRY S. SHRYOCK ET AL., THE METHODS AND MATERIALS OF DEMOGRAPHY 81 (4th 
prtg. 1980).  
 96. Id. 
 97. See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: 
Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 976 (2013).  
 98. Simon Szreter, The Right of Registration: Development, Identity Registration, and 
Social Security—A Historical Perspective, 35 WORLD DEV. 67, 72–73 (2007), 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X06001811. 
 99. Id. at 67. 
 100. Simon Szreter, Registration of Identities in Early Modern English Parishes and 
Amongst the English Overseas, in 182 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY: REGISTRATION 
AND RECOGNITION 67, 71 (Keith Breckenridge & Simon Szreter eds., 2012).  
 101. EDWARD HIGGS, THE INFORMATION STATE IN ENGLAND: THE CENTRAL COLLECTION OF 
INFORMATION ON CITIZENS SINCE 1500, at 39 (2004). 
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early modern England’s version of the welfare state, allocated money to 
beneficiaries according to their recorded status in the parish.102  
The parish system stopped working well in the early nineteenth 
century for several reasons. The Industrial Revolution disrupted 
traditional communities and increased mobility.103 Also, many 
dissenting, non-Anglican sects, such as the Quakers, often did not use the 
parish registries.104 These changes led to the government’s fear that, due 
to inadequate recordkeeping, the poor could “double dip,” receiving 
benefits at more than one parish.105  
These shortcomings led to the creation of a national registry office, 
the General Register Office of England and Wales (GRO),106 which was 
a government-run recordkeeping office. While some scholars—notably, 
Anthony Giddens—have argued that the GRO was created to allow for 
surveillance, others see the GRO as only continuing the function of 
ensuring property rights and succession.107 But despite centralized 
recordkeeping, England, like the United States, still retained the common 
law name.108  
Scandinavian countries relied upon parish recordkeeping, and the 
church records are quite accurate, extending back to the Middle Ages. 
Parish records were seamlessly merged with government registries in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.109 This shift occurred in 1924 in 
Denmark.110 This transition occurred earlier in Sweden in 1858 when the 
                                                                                                                     
 102. See id. at 41–42. 
 103. See Roger Lane, Crime and the Industrial Revolution: British and American Views, 7 J. 
SOC. HIST. 287, 287 (1974).  
 104. See General Register Office: Society of Friends’ Registers, Notes and Certificates of 
Births, Marriages and Burials, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ 
details/r/C13331 (last visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
 105. See Jane Caplan, “This or That Particular Person”: Protocols of Identification in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe, in DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
STATE PRACTICES IN THE MODERN WORLD 49, 56 (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001). 
 106. See generally GEN. REG. OFF., http://www.gro.gov.uk/gro/content/ (last visited Jan. 10, 
2016) (current GRO website).   
 107. Compare HIGGS, supra note 101, at 49–63 (noting that many of GRO’s records “reveal 
such information collection as part of state surveillance but also the creation of rights to property 
through the official recording of vital events and the will of testators”), with ANTHONY GIDDENS, 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 57–58 (1990) (arguing that “administrative concentration 
depends . . . upon the development of surveillance capacities”). 
 108. State v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043, 1047 (Ala. 1982) (“[T]he common law of England, 
that is, that all persons have the right, irrespective of marriage, to use the name or names of their 
choice so long as the name is not used for a fraudulent purpose.”). 
 109. See Karl Jakob Krogness, Numbered Individuals, Digital Traditions, and Individual 
Rights: Civil Status Registration in Denmark 1645 to 2010, 28 RITSUMEIKAN L. REV. 87, 90, 93 
(2011). 
 110. Id. at 97. 
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Central Bureau of Statistics was created; the Bureau, in fact, collected 
(and still does in rural Sweden) data from church parish records.111  
France instituted registries as early as 1667 in response to the reforms 
of the Council of Trent.112 In 1793, as a result of the French Revolution, 
recordkeeping was moved from the church to civil registries.113 In a law 
dating from the French Revolution, which remained unchanged until 
1993, no French person could bear any name but the one in the official 
registry.114 No one could change a name except by an official act of the 
Conseil d’Etat, which rarely granted these requests.115 Even in marriage, 
neither women nor men could change their name; rather, they adopt a 
nom d’usage. French people can use the nom d’usage in all aspects of 
their lives, but it does not appear on formal legal documents.116  
Compared to the French and Scandinavian systems, Germany created 
its registration system much later because it was not unified until 1871.117 
Some smaller German states, particularly those under French influence, 
employed registration systems.118 In the February 1875 
Personenestandsgestz, the unified German state introduced civil 
registration and created a network of districts and offices.119 The German 
central government delegated to the states the power to regulate names 
and the conditions under which individuals could change their names.120 
The German states adopted consistent rules that greatly resembled the 
French.121 In 1895, the great German law authority, Otto Gierke, declared 
that “a change of family name may [only] be granted by authority of the 
                                                                                                                     
 111. Ann-Sofie Kälvemark, The Country that Kept Track of Its Population: Methodological 
Aspects of Swedish Population Records, 2 SCANDINAVIAN J. HIST. 211, 214–15 (1977). 
 112. Caplan, supra note 105. The Council of Trent had a huge impact on the recordkeeping 
of vital statistics in Roman Catholic countries, including marriage statistics. See Adam Candeub 
& Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 735, 769 (2011). 
 113. David R. Weir, New Estimates of Nuptiality and Marital Fertility in France, 1740–
1911, 48 POPULATION STUD. 307, 311 (1994). 
 114. Loi 6 du 23 août 1794 des noms de famille [Law 6 of August 23, 1794 on family names]. 
The law of April 1, 1803 (11 Germinal, An XI) confirmed this law. The law did not change until 
1993, when a somewhat more liberal approach was adopted. Caplan, supra note 105, at 56–57. 
 115. Caplan, supra note 105, at 57. 
 116. Marie-France Valetas, The Surname of Married Women in the European Union, 
POPULATION & SOCIÉTÉS (Inst. Nat’l d’Études Démographiques), Apr. 2001, at 1. 
 117. Issues Relevant to the U.S. Foreign Diplomacy: Unification of German States, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/countries/issues/german-unification (last visited Nov. 7, 
2015). 
 118. Caplan, supra note 105, at 60. 
 119. Id. at 61. 
 120. See id. at 60. 
 121. Id. at 60–61. 
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state.”122 Current law has softened this requirement, although name 
change is still difficult.123 
In conclusion, if the first step in creating a universal system of 
identification is the creation of a definitive, centralized list with unique 
names identifying individuals, then the United States was uniquely 
behind the curve. Allowing citizens the freedom to adopt names of their 
choosing without a formal name change—combined with the 
decentralization of its registration system—rendered any efforts to 
enforce any identification system fairly impossible. In contrast, France, 
Germany, and other civil law countries, as well as England, had 
centralized registries by the nineteenth century. Unlike the continental 
countries, England did—and still does—have common law names. In the 
1930s, the United States, however, shifted toward a European system of 
identification—and the following section examines that shift.  
2.  Step Two: The Social Security Number and Toward Obligatory 
Identification 
The SSN emerged slowly as a first step to a mandatory identifier. It 
was only recently—under the REAL ID Act that incorporates the SSNs 
into driver’s licenses124—that a complete identification regime emerged. 
The story of the SSN’s emergence demonstrates a “free rider” 
phenomenon in identification systems. SSNs are very useful not only to 
governments, but also to private entities.125 However, they are expensive 
and difficult to create.126 Once one identification system is created, there 
exists a tremendous incentive to “piggyback” onto it and thus make it 
universal.127 An identification numbers program’s “administrative 
efficiency . . . encourages government agencies and private firms to 
adopt national identification numbers.”128  
                                                                                                                     
 122. Id. at 62. 
 123. See BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], art. 10, translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgbeg/englisch_bgbeg.html (Ger.). 
 124. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 302, 312 (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note (2012) (Improved Security for Drivers’ Licenses and Personal 
Identification Cards). 
 125. See R. Brian Black, Legislating U.S. Data Privacy in the Context of National 
Identification Numbers: Models from South Africa and the United Kingdom, 34 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 397, 398–99 (2001). 
 126. Carolyn Puckett, The Story of the Social Security Number, 69 SOC. SECURITY BULL., no. 
2, 2009, at 55, 55–56. 
 127. See Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2015) (noting that 
there were already twenty other nations operating programs similar to Social Security at the time 
the United States adopted the program). 
 128. Black, supra note 125, at 402. 
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Congress never passed a law explicitly mandating the SSN. Rather, it 
empowered the newly created Social Security Administration in 1935 to 
create an identification system.129 Politicians at the time provided several 
assurances that the number would never become a national identifier—
and such a claim was plausible given the limited coverage of the early 
social security system, which excluded most women, African Americans, 
other minorities, as well as agricultural workers.130 
The adoption of the SSN outside of the Social Security Administration 
was gradual.131 In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized 
federal agencies to use the number outside of the SSA.132 While agencies 
took decades to adopt the SSN as their official identifier, the SSN 
eventually became indispensable for receiving any government 
benefits.133 After the implementation of the SSN in 1936, “its use as an 
identification number has been congressionally mandated more than forty 
times.”134 
For example, “[i]n 1961, the Civil Service Commission forced all 
federal employees to obtain a social security number for use as an 
employee identification number.”135 The following year, the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) adopted the SSN as an identifier for tax 
returns.136 Now, “[t]he Internal Revenue Code stipulates that a SSN is the 
primary identifying number for individuals who file returns.”137 The U.S. 
Department of Defense ended the use of service numbers for military 
personnel in favor of SSNs in 1969.138 In 1972, legislation gave the Social 
Security Administration power to assign SSNs to all legally admitted 
noncitizens at entry and to anyone receiving or applying for federal 
benefits.139 In 1973, the Supplemental Security Income program began to 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, § 807(b), 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1007 (2012)). 
 130. Miriam Cohen & Michael Hanagan, Politics, Industrialization and Citizenship: 
Unemployment Policy in England, France and the United States, 1890–1950, in CITIZENSHIP, 
IDENTITY AND SOCIAL HISTORY 91, 122 (Charles Tilly ed., 1996). 
 131. Black, supra note 125, at 411. 
 132. Exec. Order No. 9397, 3 C.F.R. ch. 2, §§ 283–84 (1943–1948).  
 133. HARPER, supra note 34, at 194–95; Social Security Number Chronology, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/ssn/ssnchron.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2005).   
 134. Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in National Identification 
Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 350 (2002). 
 135. Black, supra note 125, at 411. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Flavio L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and 
Decisions to Control the Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL 
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 529, 540 (1998). 
 138. Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 133.  
 139. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 137, 86 Stat. 1329, 1364 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2012)); Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 
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use SSNs.140 In 1979, Congress required households receiving food 
stamps to disclose each household member’s SSN.141 In 1981, disclosure 
of the SSN was required for all adult members of households with 
children enrolled in the school lunch program.142 In 1982, all those 
seeking aid under federal loan programs were required to provide 
SSNs.143 In 1984, in an effort to go after “deadbeat dads,” the federal 
government required an alimony payer to furnish the IRS with the SSN 
of the ex-spouse receiving the payments.144 Congress, in 1989, required 
that the National Student Loan Data system include SSNs of borrowers 
and that the SSNs of the parents of school lunch program applicants be 
provided.145 In 1990, Congress required an SSN to obtain Department of 
Veterans Affairs benefits146 for each dependent aged one or older claimed 
by a tax filer147 and for owners of grocery stores or other establishments 
that accept food stamps.148 Congress, in 1994, authorized SSN use for 
jury selection and federal workers’ compensation.149  
Finally, the 1996 welfare reform legislation required that the SSN 
appear on numerous official documents, including professional licenses, 
driver’s licenses, death certificates, birth records, divorce decrees, 
                                                                                                                     
133. 
 140. See Chronology: 1970s, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/history/1970.html (last 
visited Oct. 25, 2015).   
 141. Food Stamp Act of 1977, Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-58, 93 Stat. 389, 391 (1979) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2025 (2012)). 
 142. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 803, 95 Stat. 357, 
525 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1758); Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 
133. 
 143. Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365, § 4, 96 Stat. 1749, 1751 (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6103 note (2012) (Taxpayer Identifying Number: Persons Applying for 
Loans Under Federal Loan Programs Required to Furnish)); Social Security Number Chronology, 
supra note 133. 
 144. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 422, 98 Stat. 494, 797–98 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C § 215); Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 133. 
 145. Student Loan Reconciliation Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 2005, 103 
Stat. 2106, 2121 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092b (2012)); Social Security Number 
Chronology, supra note 133. 
 146. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 8053, 104 Stat. 
1388 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 3001 (2012)).  
 147. Id. § 11,112 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6109(e)); Social Security Number 
Chronology, supra note 133. 
 148. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, § 1735, 
104 Stat. 3359, 3791–92 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)); Social Security 
Number Chronology, supra note 133. 
 149. Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-296, §§ 304, 318, 108 Stat. 1464, 1520, 1533 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.); Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 133. 
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marriage licenses, support orders, and paternity determinations.150 
However, in 1999, Congress repealed the requirement for SSNs to appear 
on some of these documents, such as driver’s licenses and birth 
records.151 Blood donations also require SSNs.152 
Beyond being the required identifier for the federal government, the 
SSN has also become an essential identifier in state government.153 In 
1976, the federal government authorized the use of SSNs for state taxes, 
state benefits programs, and motor vehicle registration.154 While the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 405 (2012)) prohibits federal, state, or local governments 
from displaying SSNs on drivers’ licenses, the Real ID Act section 
202(d)(5) requires states to verify SSNs when issuing all new drivers 
licenses—ensuring that the REAL ID Act creates a database of state 
motor vehicle departments indexed by social security number.155 Further, 
under some circumstances the federal government can disclose tax return 
information—which includes the SSN—to state enforcement 
authorities.156 Unsurprisingly, state and federal records in the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC) also include SSNs.157  
Of course, the SSN is also a tool to track private market transactions. 
As pointed out above, the efficiencies and ease of using an established 
identification regime are tremendous, as private entities can “piggyback” 
onto established identification regimes without expending the cost of 
creating their own regime. And, by the 1970s, the SSN became a tool for 
tracking private financial transactions.158  
                                                                                                                     
 150. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, § 317, 110 Stat. 2105, 2220–21 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)); Social 
Security Number Chronology, supra note 133. 
 151. Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 133. 
 152. Komuves, supra note 137, at 538. 
 153. See Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 133. 
 154. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1211, 90 Stat. 1520, 1711–12 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 405); Social Security Number Chronology, supra note 133. 
 155. See TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32722, INTELLIGENCE REFORM 
AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004: NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR DRIVERS’ LICENSES, 
SOCIAL SECURITY CARDS, AND BIRTH CERTIFICATES 4, 7 (2005). 
 156. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(c) (2012). The current version of the statute allows the disclosure 
of parts of a return for numerous other reasons. Id. Disclosure of “return information,” which 
includes the SSN, is more limited but includes child support enforcement and student loan default 
collection. See id. § 6103(l)(6)–(m)(4). 
 157. Komuves, supra note 137, at 542 (“In addition to the federally-maintained NCIC file, 
state-maintained law enforcement records are also keyed to SSNs.”); see also Privacy Act of 1974; 
Modified System of Records, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,774, 19,776–77 (Apr. 20, 1995) (authorizing the 
FBI to add names and identifying data of members of violent criminal gangs and terrorist 
organizations to the NCIC’s information). 
 158. See id. at 67–68. 
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The move towards the SSN as a financial identifier started slow. In 
1964, the U.S. Department of Treasury began to require buyers of Series 
H savings bonds to submit their SSNs; in 1973, the Treasury extended 
this requirement to buyers of Series E savings bonds.159 More 
importantly, in 1970, Congress passed laws requiring banks, savings and 
loan associations, credit unions, and securities dealers to obtain the SSNs 
of all customers160—a requirement that the USA PATRIOT Act later 
strengthened.161 In 1983, this requirement was extended to all interest-
bearing accounts held by any institution.162 Finally, as part of its money 
laundering laws, Congress required persons engaged in a trade or 
business to file a report including an SSN to the IRS for cash transactions 
over $10,000.163   
The pervasiveness of the SSN requirements for financial information 
led to its use in financial records, beyond those uses that Congress or 
statute required. For instance, credit reports use SSNs.164 Additionally, 
“most banks and lending institutions use the [SSN] as the method of 
identifying certain persons.”165 Similarly, the SSN is often the unofficial 
personal identifier for all healthcare information as well as professional 
licenses issued by accrediting organizations.166 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 159. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY CARD at app. B (1997), https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ssnreportap.html. 
 160. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, and 15 U.S.C.); Social Security Number 
Chronology, supra note 133. 
 161. See International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326, 115 Stat. 296, 317 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5318) 
(outlining requirements for accountholder verification and identification). 
 162. Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 104, 97 Stat. 
369, 371–76 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3406); Social Security Number Chronology, 
supra note 133. 
 163. 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.311–12 (2015) (requiring a financial institution to report on a 
Currency Transaction Report “the name and address of the individual presenting a transaction” 
that exceeds $10,000, and “the identity, account number, and the social security or taxpayer 
identification number . . . of any person . . . on whose behalf such transaction [was] . . . effected”). 
 164. Credit Reporting Basics: How Private Is My Credit Report?, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/how-private-my-credit-report (last updated June 
2015). 
 165.  Komuves, supra note 137, at 537 (alteration in original) (quoting Jeffrey A. Taylor, 
Medical Process Patents and Patient Privacy Rights, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
131, 141 n.75 (1995)). 
 166. See Mike Miliard, Without a UPI, Healthcare Awash in SSNs, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS 
(Oct. 23, 2014, 3:20 PM), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/without-upi-healthcare-awash-
ssns; Credit Reporting Basics, supra note 164.  
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3.  Step Three: The REAL ID Act of 2005 and Criminalizing 
Pseudonymity  
After creating a definitive registry and mandating its use, the third step 
requires making false or pseudonymous identification either illegal or 
impracticable. The REAL ID Act of 2005 played a central role in 
achieving this result,167 mandating that the states create identification 
cards that are unique and associated with the holder’s SSN.168 Thus, it is 
legally impossible to obtain state identification under any name that is not 
the same as the one registered with the Social Security Administration. 
At the same time, the government and private industry, in a plethora of 
different areas ranging from healthcare to banking, require a 
“government-issued” identification, which typically means an 
identification card compliant with the REAL ID Act.   
Making misrepresentations illegal involves a complicated nexus of 
laws. Most of the laws are meant to prevent fraud in government benefits, 
such as the prohibition against misstating one’s SSN.169 Some involve the 
need to track taxable income, as with the Bank Security Act’s 
requirement on identification of interest-bearing accounts and brokerage 
accounts.170 Others, such as the prohibition on false identification cards, 
seem simply to enforce registration requirements.171 
Rather than describe these laws, the following Subsections present 
several scenarios to demonstrate how laws and, in particular, the 
regulatory and business schemes that have developed around the SSN 
have made pseudonymity impossible.  
a.  Healthcare 
Many individuals would wish to have healthcare provided 
confidentially. A person’s health affects others’ views of that person. For 
instance, many would wish to keep private mental illness or erectile 
dysfunction. Business people may not wish to share details about their 
health, as it might affect potential clients from entering into long-term 
relations.  
                                                                                                                     
 167. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 302, 312 (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301). 
 168. 6 C.F.R. § 37.11(e) (2015) (“[I]ndividuals presenting the identity documents listed in 
§ 37.11(c)(1) and (2) must present his or her Social Security Administration account number card; 
or, if a Social Security Administration account card is not available, the person may present any 
of the following documents bearing the applicant’s SSN . . . .”). 
 169. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2012) (prohibiting fraud in connection with identification 
documents). 
 170. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.410 (2015) (requiring banks to create and maintain additional 
records). 
 171. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 
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Congress recognized this desire for privacy when it passed the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), a rather strange 
“law.” Section 264(a) of HIPAA requires the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to make “recommendations on standards with 
respect to the privacy of individually identifiable health information” 
within twelve months of HIPAA’s enactment date.172 Section 264(b) 
explains that these recommendations must address “at least” the 
following issues: 
(1) The rights that an individual who is a subject of 
individually identifiable health information should have. 
(2) The procedures that should be established for the 
exercise of such rights. 
(3) The uses and disclosures of such information that 
should be authorized or required.  
 Section 264(c) states that if Congress should fail to enact 
legislation governing “standards with respect to the privacy 
of individually identifiable health information” within 36 
months of the enactment of HIPAA, HHS shall promulgate 
“final regulations” containing such privacy standards not 
later than 42 months after the enactment of HIPAA.173  
Congress never passed such protections, so HIPAA is largely a 
regulation.174 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 264(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note (2012) 
(Recommendations with Respect to Privacy of Certain Health Information)). 
 173. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
224 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citation omitted) (quoting HIPAA § 264(b)–(c)), 
aff’d, 67 F. App’x 253 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 174. See, e.g., Modifications to the HIPAA Rules Under the Health Information Technology 
for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 78 
Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2015)). 
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As many commentators agree, HIPAA regulation has failed to protect 
patient privacy175 and, in fact, stymies medical research.176 One 
commentator asserts that “HIPAA [is] a fig leaf—or worse, as kudzu 
choking off the free flow of information.”177 
A pseudonym could provide some help. Suppose a person wished to 
secure his data against de-anonymization or simply from nosy secretaries 
and other hospital employees in his small town. This person could receive 
healthcare under a pseudonym, with a slightly altered date of birth. 
Instead of John Doe, born November 14, 1980, he is Jonathan 
Davidfreund, born November 20, 1980. This difference would not affect 
medical advice or treatment, as the age difference of six days could not 
affect a medical diagnosis or treatment remedy. All the data related to the 
treatment—a Caucasian male, birth date November 20, 1980, in the zip 
code 19075—would be associated with a pseudonym.178 
The following discussion shows how regulations working with the 
REAL ID Act make such a strategy impossible under any method of 
healthcare payment. 
Government-Sponsored and Private Insurance Programs. With 
government insurance (Medicare or Medicaid), pseudonymity is virtually 
impossible. The government is paying benefits and requires the use of the 
SSN and the formal legal name. And, if someone attempts to use a 
different name, there are countless statutes she may be violating that 
involve false statements.179  
                                                                                                                     
 175. E.g., Joshua D.W. Collins, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a Private Right of Action 
to Remedy Privacy Rule Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV. 199, 201–02 (2007) (“While HIPAA 
imposes a host of obligations on covered entities in an attempt to increase patient privacy, it does 
not explicitly create any individual rights for patients affected by medical privacy 
violations. . . . Lack of medical record protection does not just harm those whose privacy is 
violated.”); Kendra Gray, The Privacy Rule: Are We Being Deceived?, 11 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 89, 118 (2008) (“The Privacy Rule is not working. Something must be changed to ensure 
that our personal health information is being protected and that the health care industry has an 
incentive to obey the law.”); Daniel J. Oates, HIPAA Hypocrisy and the Case for Enforcing 
Federal Privacy Standards Under State Law, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 745, 776 (2007) (“Problems 
with information privacy have become exponentially more pronounced in the last decade. The 
privacy protections in HIPAA have proven insufficient to protect patient’s rights.”). 
 176. Ohm, supra note 56, at 1769–70. 
 177. Susannah Fox, HIPAA’s Broken Promises, HEALTH CARE BLOG (Sept. 27, 2009), 
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2009/09/27/hipaas-broken-promises/ (quoting Paul Ohm). 
 178. See supra Part I. 
 179. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (prohibiting conspiracy to defraud the United States); 
id. § 1001 (prohibiting false statements generally); id. § 1002 (prohibiting possession of false 
papers); id. § 1027 (prohibiting false statements and concealment of facts); id. § 1028 (prohibiting 
fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents); id. § 1031 (prohibiting 
major fraud against the United States); id. § 1035 (prohibiting false statements relating to 
healthcare); 42 U.S.C. § 3795a (2012) (prohibiting falsification or concealment of facts for federal 
assistance). 
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But, what if she has employer-provided private insurance? While the 
law may not explicitly prohibit an individual from using a common law 
name, numerous laws and recent regulations require insurance 
companies, employers, and healthcare providers to obtain formal, legal 
names found in government-issued identification. The REAL ID Act, 
combined with recent regulations under the Affordable Care Act or 
industry requirements,180 makes the use of a driver’s license or other 
government-issued identification necessary. Since she cannot obtain a 
government-issued identification under a pseudonym, she is practically, 
if not legally, forbidden from obtaining employer-provided healthcare 
under a pseudonym.  
Employer-Provided Health Insurance. To claim insurance for an 
employee, the employer would have to report to the IRS the health 
benefits it paid on the employee’s behalf and would use an SSN—
otherwise it would have to pay tax on the amounts expended to purchase 
the employee’s insurance.181 If there were an audit, employers would 
have to show that benefits were being extended to an actual person. 
While it might be theoretically possible for an employer to keep 
records documenting that it is purchasing insurance for an employee 
under a pseudonym, the employer would bear a significant cost and risk 
of legal liability from a host of laws, including making false statements 
to Medicare182 and the Wire Fraud Act.183 Nonetheless, even if an 
employee were able to have his employer purchase health insurance for 
him under an assumed name, he would have additional problems from 
his private insurance company and healthcare provider. 
Insurance Company Coverage. Group health insurance companies 
must provide SSNs so that Medicare can coordinate payments with other 
health benefits.184 This ensures that people with two kinds of insurance 
do not “double dip.” It seems likely that insurance companies would have 
issues with persons whose SSN matched with another name on file with 
the government. In short, given the legal liability that insurance 
                                                                                                                     
 180. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: IMMIGRANTS, 
TAXES, AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1–2 (2015), https://www.nilc.org/document. 
html?id=115; Employer-Provided Health Coverage Informational Reporting Requirements: 
Questions and Answers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/uac/Employer-Provided-
Health-Coverage-Informational-Reporting-Requirements:-Questions-and-Answers (last updated 
Sept. 2, 2015). 
 181. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2012) (providing for deductibility of trade or business 
expenses). 
 182. See Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007, Pub. L No. 110-173, § 111, 
121 Stat 2492, 2497–99 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)) (describing liabilities 
incurred for failure to follow the Act). 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (prohibiting fraud by wire, radio, or television). 
 184. Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act § 111. 
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companies face concerning obligations to obtain correct information, 
insurance companies would likely not issue cards with a common law 
name. 
Direct Payment to Healthcare Providers. Providers must adopt 
policies to prevent identity fraud under the so-called 2007 “Red Flags 
Rule” of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, which 
amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act.185 These include the presentation 
of government-issued identification; Congress limited the scope of these 
regulations to exclude many healthcare providers.186 Nonetheless, to 
prevent identity fraud, many insurance companies still require providers 
to obtain identification.187 Thus, corporate policies would likely require 
government-issued identification, which must match one’s SSN. It would 
be illegal to have duplicate identifications—one with a pseudonym or an 
identification that did not match one’s SSN.  
Payment with Cash. If one wishes to maintain anonymity by paying 
with cash, presumably that person would not need to deal with installment 
payments, and the Red Flags Rule would not apply. But, again, 
practicality limits the effectiveness of this strategy. First, few people with 
serious or chronic illnesses could afford such a strategy. Second, large 
medical systems are unlikely to make exceptions to their anti-identity 
fraud programs.  
Payment to Pharmacist. Finally, consider a person who is able to find 
a provider that does not require identification. Her healthcare provider 
takes cash and she uses a pseudonym. She is diagnosed with a sinus 
infection and obtains a prescription for an antibiotic, which she takes to 
the pharmacist. At last, she thinks, she can obtain anonymous healthcare! 
However, under state laws designed to prevent individuals from abusing 
prescription drugs, she very well may have to provide a driver’s license 
at the pharmacy where she fills her prescription.188 And do not even think 
                                                                                                                     
 185. Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 112, 117 Stat. 1952, 1955–57 (2003) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1 (2012)). 
 186. In 2009, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the application 
of the Red Flags Rule’s definition of creditor was too broad. See Am. Bar Ass’n v. Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, 671 F. Supp. 2d 64, 70, 88 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing the Red Flags Rule’s related 
answers on the Commission’s “Frequently Asked Questions” website), vacated as moot 636 F.3d 
641 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Congress later changed the law to limit the scope of the Red Flags 
regulations. Chris Dimick, Red Flags Clarification Exempts Most, Not All Providers, J. AHIMA 
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://journal.ahima.org/2010/12/16/red-flag-clarification-exempts-most-not-all-
providers/. 
 187. See, e.g., BlueCross BlueShield of ILL., BLUE REVIEW FOR CONTRACTING 
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL PROVIDERS 6 (2014), http://www.bcbsil.com/pdf/education/ 
bluereview/june_14.pdf. 
 188. According to a recent survey, the following states have identification review to obtain 
prescription drugs: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North 
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about using fake identification; both federal and state law prohibit 
possessing a fake ID, let alone using one to procure prescription 
medicine.189   
b.  Pseudonymous Purchases and Financial Transactions 
“I shop therefore I am”—or so says post-modern artist Barbara 
Kruger.190 Few matters are more personal or more defining than what 
people buy and where people put their money. Cash allows for 
anonymous purchasing as well as storage of wealth. After the purchase, 
there is no record of what a person bought. Similarly, no entity keeps 
track of cash held by individuals—up to a point. Cash transactions over 
$10,000 cannot be anonymous; rather, those involved must submit a 
report.191 
While some degree of anonymity is possible when using cash, the 
following shows that anonymity is impossible if any portion of personal 
wealth is in any other form or if the person conducts any other type of 
transaction. This shortcoming renders anonymous online purchases and 
financial transactions virtually impossible. Additionally, the pattern that 
destroyed anonymity in healthcare works the same way in financial 
transactions: the government creates regulations that require entities to 
                                                                                                                     
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-612a (2015); 24 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 5.1.10 (2013); FLA. STAT. 
§ 893.04 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-80 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-41 (2015); IDAHO 
ADMIN. CODE r. 27.01.01.464 (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/312 (2015); IND. CODE § 35-48-
7-8.l(b) (2015); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:971(E) (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 32, § 13795 (2015); 105 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 700.001, .012 (2015); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 338.3102, .3162 (2015); MINN. STAT. 
§ 152.11 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.431 (2015); N.M. CODE R. § 16.19.20.42 (LexisNexis 
2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §§ 80.73–.74 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-106.1 
(2015); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 61-04-03.1-01 (2015); OR. ADMIN. R. 855-019-0210 (2015); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-53-360 (2015); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.074 (West 2015); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4215b (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3420.1 (2015); W. VA. CODE R. § 60A-
3-308 (2015); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MENU OF STATE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG IDENTIFICATION LAWS 2 (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/menu-
pdil.pdf (reporting that twenty-five states allow pharmacists to request identification before filling 
a prescription order).  
 189. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (prohibiting fraud and related activity in connection with 
identification documents, authentication features, and information); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REGULATORY STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTING YOUTH ACCESS TO ALCOHOL: BEST PRACTICES 
27 (2011), https://www.ncjtc.org/PIRE/ES/TOOLBOXforEnvironmentalStrategies/Relevant% 
20Documentation%20and%20Resources/Publications/RegulatoryStrategiesPublication.pdf. 
 190. Ron Rosenbaum, Barbara Kruger’s Artwork Speaks Truth to Power, SMITHSONIAN 
MAG. (July 2012), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/barbara-krugers-artwork-
speaks-truth-to-power-137717540/?no-ist. 
 191. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2012) (requiring a financial institution to report transactions 
regulated by the Secretary of the Treasury); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.311–12 (2015) (requiring a 
financial institution to report a Currency Transaction Report). 
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request information, including government-provided identifications.192 
And, as Professor Michael Froomkin points out, these identifications can 
go “viral.”193  
Start with opening a bank account or applying for a credit card, or 
even a PayPal account.194 Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act195 
requires certain financial institutions to have a Customer Identification 
Program (CIP).196 This statutory requirement led the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, National Credit Union 
Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of 
Thrift Supervision, and the U.S. Department of Treasury to jointly issue 
regulations.197 These regulations require that the bank verify the 
customer’s name, date of birth, residential or business street address, and 
identification number.198 The regulations make clear that for U.S. 
citizens, a bank must obtain a U.S. taxpayer identification number—for 
example, an SSN, individual taxpayer identification number, or employer 
identification number—to open an account.199  
The CIP regulations prescribe certain methods and documents for 
verifying this information.200 For individuals, these documents may 
include “unexpired government-issued identification evidencing 
nationality or residence and bearing a photograph or similar 
safeguard.”201 In addition to documentary evidence, the CIP allows for 
non-documentary evidence for the purpose of determining whether “there 
is logical consistency between the identifying information provided, such 
as the customer’s name, street address, ZIP code, telephone number, date 
of birth, and social security number (logical verification).”202 
Thus, while the CIP regulations do not provide explicit instructions, 
as banking institutions must simply make “reasonable” efforts to 
determine customers’ identities, its “suggestions” provide safe harbors 
                                                                                                                     
 192. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.311–12.  
 193. Froomkin, supra note 77, at 56. 
 194. PayPal’s Customer Identification Program (CIP) and Its Benefits, PAYPAL, 
https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/helpcenter/helphub/article/?solutionId=FAQ734 (last  
visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
 195. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326, 115 Stat. 272, 317 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(1)(B)). 
 196. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.220. 
 197. See id. § 1010.100(r), .350. 
 198. Id. § 1020.220(a)(2)(i)(A). 
 199. Id. § 1020.220(a)(2)(i)(A)(4). 
 200. Id. § 1020.220(a)(2)(ii). 
 201. Id. § 1020.220(a)(2)(ii)(A)(1). 
 202. Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit Unions and 
Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,090, 25,100 (May 9, 2003) (codified at 
31 C.F.R. § 1010.220).  
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that banks will likely apply.203 These safe harbors all have the driver’s 
license or other government-issued identification anchored in them.204 
Failure to follow the CIP regulations can lead to severe criminal and civil 
penalties,205 as well as expulsion from the banking profession.206 
Until the last few decades or so, one could open a bank account under 
a pseudonym with some difficulty, but over the last few years it has 
become almost impossible.207 It would require essentially lying about 
one’s SSN, an illegal act.208 Or, one could use fake identification, but this 
again is illegal.209 In short, the common law right has evaporated. 
Naturally, these laws exist to assist law enforcement in uncovering 
money laundering, child pornography, terrorism, and tax evasion.210 But 
they have the effect of baring all private financial transactions naked to 
the state. Technology does play a role here in that it facilitates the 
collection of this information, but it is the law that is doing most of the 
work. 
Some scholars argue that modern banking would be impossible under 
anonymous or pseudonymous accounts, even if relying upon modern 
cryptographic techniques.211 Perhaps. But, as discussed above, the 
common law has developed simple rules to address pseudonymity in 
secured transactions, inheritance, and negotiable instruments.212 These 
rules do not provide perfect anonymity, but they provide enough for the 
parties involved and seem to have worked well enough.  
Finally, at one time, banks—mostly in Switzerland and other tax 
havens such as Andorra and the Channel Islands—offered numbered 
accounts, which were pseudonymous.213 Each client had a number, and 
                                                                                                                     
 203. See 31 C.F.R § 1020.220(a)(2). 
 204. Id. § 1020(a)(2)(ii)(A). 
 205. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012) (describing civil penalties); id. § 5322 (describing criminal 
penalties). 
 206. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(2) (2012). 
 207. See Streber, Numbered and Pseudonym Accounts, STREBER WEEKLY (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.streber.st/2014/05/numbered-and-pseudonym-accounts/. 
 208. 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.301 (tax evasion); id. § 1010.520(b) (money laundering and 
terrorism); Deborah L. Morgan, Note, Digital Signatures: Will Government Registration of Users 
Mean that Anonymity in Transactions on the Internet Is Forever Lost?, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003, 
1005 (2004) (child pornography). 
 211. E.g., Peter Swire, The Uses and Limits of Financial Cryptography: A Law Professor’s 
Perspective (Aug. 15, 1997) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.peterswire.net/archive/ 
pscrypto.html. 
 212. See supra Section II.A.  
 213. Numbered Bank Account, SWISS PRIVACY, http://www.swiss-privacy.com/numbered-
bank-account.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (“Numbered bank accounts are offered by Swiss 
banks to the majority of their clients.”); Streber, supra note 207 (noting Andorra is a jurisdiction 
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the bank had no record of who owned the assets.214 To make a withdrawal 
or deposit, clients simply presented a secret number.215 In the United 
States, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2010216 essentially 
made these accounts illegal for Americans.217 This law places 
considerable disclosure duties on American taxpayers who have overseas 
accounts, and pseudonymous ownership is considered an indicium of a 
willful violation.218 
Abandoning all identification requirements for banking is not 
desirable and certainly not politically palatable,219 but the gradual erosion 
of individual rights should make one hesitate. One can gain significant 
anonymity in financial transactions simply by incorporating and having 
a corporation make those purchases.220 This is a relative type of privacy 
that could be very useful: vendors will not know with whom they are 
dealing, although the bank and the IRS will. But this system would be 
expensive and impractical for most.221 On the other hand, pseudonymous 
financial transactions would be available to more people, and making 
                                                                                                                     
that allowed pseudonymous bank accounts); Arden Dale, Tax Havens Shift as Luxembourg 
Loosens Bank Secrecy, WALL ST. J.: TOTAL RETURN (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:03 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2013/04/10/tax-havens-shift-as-luxembourg-loosens-bank-
secrecy/ (“[The] Channel Islands . . . are favorite destinations for some who want to keep money 
below the radar of tax authorities and out of sight of the world in general.”). 
 214. Streber, supra note 207. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 97, 97–117 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 217. See Laura Saunders, What Offshore Account Holders Need to Know About the Credit 
Suisse Plea, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (May 20, 2014, 8:01 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/05/20/what-offshore-account-holders-need-to-know-about 
-the-credit-suisse-plea/ (stating that “foreign financial institutions will begin the process of 
reporting income information about their account holders who are U.S. taxpayers to the IRS . . . or 
face severe consequences”). 
 218. Id. (“Evidence of willfulness could include having an account in a country with bank-
secrecy laws, such as Switzerland; not disclosing the account to your tax preparer; having a 
numbered account or one held under a pseudonym; [or] having undeclared income of about $5,000 
or more a year . . . .”). 
 219. Morgan, supra note 210, at 1018 (stating that “[a]ctual anonymity may not be realistic 
or desirable in all cases”); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information 
Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 
479 (1996) (“In light of these possibilities, even if they are largely theoretical, it would not be 
surprising if many governments, including the U.S. government, wish to act to discourage or 
forbid the issuance and use of completely anonymous digital cash, at least forms that allow it to 
be exchanged in denominations higher than those proposed by Mondex.”). 
 220. Allen Applbaum et al., Corporate Anonymity, FTI J. (Apr. 2013), 
http://www.ftijournal.com/article/corporate-anonymity. 
 221. See Carol Tice, The Cost of Incorporation, ALLBUSINESS, 
http://www.allbusiness.com/the-cost-of-incorporation-1650-1.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).   
 
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss2/6
2016] PRIVACY AND COMMON LAW NAMES 503 
 
them completely inaccessible impinges upon privacy that Americans 
once enjoyed. 
III.  GOVERNMENT-ISSUED IDENTIFICATION VERSUS THE COMMON LAW: 
THE DEVELOPING CASE LAW 
The United States’ de facto abolition of the common law name turns 
heavily upon the mandatory use of government-issued identification, 
primarily the driver’s license. The importance of the pervasiveness of 
government-issued identification cannot be overstated. It has become 
viral and could create the database of doom, which can record everything 
about everyone—a possibility that Professor Paul Ohm has decried (and 
descried).222 Such a mechanism seems far-fetched. But when 
identification is required—to make purchases, travel, buy alcohol, use a 
credit card, open a bank account—and that identification has consistent 
identifying information, such as name and SSN, then the outlines of such 
a database emerge. 
If one could obtain pseudonymous government identification, one 
could open bank accounts, receive healthcare, and buy alcohol under a 
pseudonym, which would evade the potential of the all-encompassing 
identifiers. Indeed, this is not an absurd idea. As mentioned above, many 
European countries are experimenting with such approaches.223  
However, the U.S. common law and the First Amendment may 
provide the right of individuals to demand that the government recognize 
their common law names. The pivotal position of government-issued 
identification creates a very interesting chicken-and-egg question. If 
common law name rights exist and the purpose of state identification is 
simply to record a name, it would seem that one might have a right to a 
government-issued identification. After all, the purpose of government 
identification is to identify a name, and the individual has the power to 
determine her name under common law.224  
The response is that, as some courts have held, neither the common 
law name right nor a First Amendment right to one’s name is a 
fundamental right.225 In other words, the right to name oneself is neither 
an enumerated right in the Bill of Rights incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor one of the few un-enumerated rights, such as 
travel and marriage, that the Court has read into the Fourteenth 
Amendment.226 Therefore, the government may reasonably regulate 
                                                                                                                     
 222. See Paul Ohm, Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2012), 
https://hbr.org/2012/08/dont-build-a-database-of-ruin. 
 223. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra Section II.A.  
 225. See infra Sections III.B–C. 
 226. See infra Section III.B. 
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naming by requiring documentation of legal name changes,227 prohibiting 
the use of pseudonym,228 and issuing state identification only upon the 
meeting of certain criteria.229  
An answer to this response might be that identification is necessary to 
engage in actions that are fundamental rights, such as the rights to marry 
or to travel. These rights are meaningless if one cannot exercise them 
under one’s name. In other words, one’s fundamental right to marriage 
includes a right to be married under one’s “true” or even 
“pseudonymous” name.230 
Other courts have recognized, at least in the prison context, a First 
Amendment right to make the government recognize a common law 
name.231 Thus, one could argue that the right to naming is fundamental, 
perhaps proceeding from the First Amendment’s right to speech and the 
Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy. 
The case law is divided, inconsistent, and undeveloped—although this 
may change as the burdensome requirements of the REAL ID Act begin 
to kick in232 and as individuals with inadequate documentation find 
themselves unable to get any identification and seek court redress.233 The 
cases point to several contradictions. On one hand, in today’s age, the 
common law name right is meaningless—as is the concomitant 
anonymity it can provide—unless one can obtain government-issued 
identification under a common law name. Similarly, there are cases that 
do lend some support for the notion that the common law name right does 
receive some First Amendment protection.234 
The best way to reconcile these cases would involve a First 
Amendment inquiry using intermediate scrutiny to examine the 
government’s refusal to grant common law name identifications. 
Intermediate scrutiny is appropriate because restrictions on what names 
go on government-issued identification are content neutral, i.e., the 
restrictions do not apply to any specific names.  
A government law or regulation satisfies intermediate scrutiny if “it 
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
                                                                                                                     
 227. See Puckett, supra note 126, at 66. 
 228. See Morgan, supra note 210, at 1018. 
 229. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES: ID-44 (2015), 
http://dmv.ny.gov/forms/id44.pdf (form for proofs of identity). 
 230. See infra Section III.D.  
 231. See infra Section III.C. 
 232. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Provides Updates on REAL ID 
Enforcement (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/10/09/dhs-provides-updates-real-id-
enforcement. 
 233. Cf. REAL ID FAQ, supra note 23. 
 234. See infra Section III.C. 
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and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”235 Applying 
intermediate scrutiny, it would be essential to identify what “important or 
substantial governmental interest” refusing common law names 
furthers.236 Presumably, the governmental interest is a pervasive 
identification regime, which is not an important or substantial 
governmental interest. Rather, the government might have an interest to 
ensure that in specific instances—for example, airplane travel or receipt 
of benefits—identity must be assured. But, there is no need for a 
comprehensive identification regime to achieve this end. As this Article 
discusses below, and as is being introduced in Europe, individuals can 
have different names in different contexts. And, perhaps, as Jim Harper 
suggests, identification can be delegated to private entities, not the 
state.237  
The following discussion examines the cases involving individuals 
requesting common law names on government-issued identification, 
canvassing the various approaches courts have taken. It concludes that a 
right exists to demand government-issued identification under certain 
circumstances. 
A.  Common Law Names Are Legal Names: The Government Must 
Simply Duly Record  
Cases concerning name changes are perhaps the most obvious 
example of states following the principle that individuals are masters of 
their name—and the state must simply record their desires. During the 
1970s, conventions about women’s married and divorced names were 
rapidly changing.238 Courts ruled that women were free to decide what 
names to use;239 the state had no business imposing its views about what 
married or divorced women should call themselves;240 and state agencies 
had to issue identification papers consistent with women’s wishes.241 In 
reaching these conclusions, courts often relied upon the ancient common 
                                                                                                                     
 235. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm., 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
 236. See id. 
 237. See HARPER, supra note 34, at 244–45. 
 238. Omi Morgenstern Leissner, The Name of the Maiden, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 253, 258 
(1997) (describing the 1970s movement “advocating women’s right to name themselves”). 
 239. See, e.g., Custer v. Bonadies, 318 A.2d 639, 641 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974). 
 240. See, e.g., In re Lawrence, 337 A.2d 49, 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). 
 241. See, e.g., Custer, 318 A.2d at 641 (“We live in the age of the women’s rights movement 
. . . . It hardly seems the time for the Connecticut courts to accept an outdated rule of common 
law requiring married women to adopt their spouse’s surnames contrary to our English common-
law heritage and to engraft that rule as an exception to the recognized right of a person to assume 
any name that he or she wishes to use.”). 
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law naming right.242 Again, this is a distinction between a common law 
country and civil law country, where there is an official registry of names 
and formal rules as to what individuals may call themselves.243 
The U.S. Department of State’s policy for issuing passports follows 
the principle that the common law controls. According to regulation, a 
person must demonstrate nationality and identity to obtain a passport.244 
To establish nationality, one usually submits a birth certificate.245 To 
establish identity, one typically submits a previous or current U.S. 
passport book; previous or current U.S. passport card; driver’s license 
(not temporary or learner’s license); Certificate of Naturalization; 
Certificate of Citizenship; military identification; or federal, state, or 
municipal government employee identification card.246 As an alternative 
method to establish one’s identity for a passport, someone who lacks 
documentary evidence can appear with a witness who can identify her 
and state that he has known her for at least two years.247 Presumably, such 
a witness could identify the person under her common law name.  
Courts have upheld not only this approach but also the principle that 
individuals are entitled to a passport in their own common law name. In 
United States v. Cox,248 the court dealt with an alleged violation of the 
law against falsifying information submitted in passport applications 
because Cox used a common law name.249 The court ruled that applicants 
can use common law names in such applications provided the state in 
which the applicant resides recognizes common law names.250  
Presumably, a person could use his common law name passport to 
open a bank account and, thereby, do business with some anonymity. But 
there would be complications if one attempted to obtain other types of 
identification. In particular, obtaining a driver’s license under the REAL 
ID Act requires consistency between the SSN and the name,251 while 
                                                                                                                     
 242. See, e.g., id. (holding that “the common-law right of a person to the use of a 
name . . . applies to the surname of a married woman”); In re Lawrence, 337 A.2d at 52 (“We 
conclude that, in circumstances such as here where the husband consents to his wife’s resumption 
of her maiden name, the denial of plaintiff’s application was without warrant under N.J.S.A. 
2A:52-1 or common law and thus an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion.”). 
 243. See supra Subsection II.B.1. 
 244. First Time Applicants, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/content/passports/ 
en/passports/first-time.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Secondary Evidence of Identification, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/ 
content/passports/english/passports/information/secondary-evidence1.html (last visited Nov. 10, 
2015). 
 248. 593 F.2d 46 (6th Cir. 1979). 
 249. Id. at 48. 
 250. Id. at 49. 
 251. See 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note (2012) (Minimum Issuance Standards). 
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opening a bank account under the CIP rules requires banks to identify 
inconsistencies among identifying documents.252 Further, it still would be 
illegal to use a different SSN on a passport, thus limiting the effective 
anonymity.253 
B.  The Government Has No Obligation to Recognize the Common 
Law Name 
One legal approach to the common law name right allows people to 
use the name in any context but concludes that the government has no 
obligation to issue identification or even recognize a common law name 
change. Under this approach, the government is only obligated to 
recognize a formal name change. Of course, as shown above, without a 
government-issued identification with a pseudonym, the common law 
name is useless in today’s world.254  
The alternative legal view starts with the assumption that the common 
law name right is not fundamental.255 Therefore, government regulation 
of its use must only be reasonable or rational.256 As explained above, 
fundamental rights are typically those enumerated rights in the Bill of 
Rights incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A typical example of this approach is the Indiana Supreme Court’s 
decision in Leone v. Commissioner, Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles,257 
which ruled on whether an individual could demand a common law name 
on his driver’s license.258 The court reasoned as follows: 
The General Assembly required an application to include 
a person’s name, birth date, and Social Security number, 
indicating it anticipated the Bureau might verify identities 
using these points of data. The Social Security 
Administration is as logical an anchor as any to accomplish 
                                                                                                                     
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 200–06. 
 253. See I.R.C. § 6039E (2012) (requiring an applicant to provide an SSN, if one exists, when 
applying for a U.S. passport or renewal of a U.S. passport). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 225–30. 
 255. Brown v. Cooke, 362 F. App’x 897, 900 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he district court 
concluded that ‘there is [no] fundamental right of citizens to compel the Government to accept a 
common-law name change and reform its records accordingly.’ We agree with this conclusion, 
but the substantive due process analysis requires further inquiry. If a proper substantive due 
process challenge to Colorado’s identification card statutes was before the district court, the court 
would have been required to examine those statutes under the rational basis test.”); Jorgensen v. 
Larsen, 930 F.2d 922, 1991 WL 55457, at *3–*4 (10th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision) 
(holding that the plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in the use of her birth name on her Utah 
driver’s license).  
 256. Jorgensen, 1991 WL 55457, at *3. 
 257. 933 N.E.2d 1244 (Ind. 2010). 
 258. Id. at 1255.  
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this end. In light of the section’s requiring an application to 
include a Social Security number and the Bureau’s 
responsibility to verify its records, there is no doubt that the 
statute allows the Bureau to use Social Security records to 
verify Appellants’ identities.  
If Appellants’ position about the statute held sway, 
drivers could change their names through the common-law 
method and demand their license reflect that change without 
taking any formal actions with the agencies that maintain 
their records. Like it or not, the Social Security 
Administration has become the custodian of Americans’ 
basic identifying information, and almost all state 
governments rely on this information to verify identities. In 
light of this reality, the Bureau has logically decided to 
verify the identities of those with licenses and identification 
cards with the Social Security Administration.259  
The sweep of this opinion is breathtaking. The whole point of the 
common law name is that individuals can use it “without taking any 
formal actions with the agencies that maintain their records.”260 With a 
sigh of indifference, the court declares that “the Social Security 
Administration has become the custodian of Americans’ basic identifying 
information.”261 The court had it exactly backwards. Individuals choose 
their names, not vice versa, and one dissenting judge made this precise 
point in Jorgensen v. Larsen.262 
Indeed, subsequent courts have stepped back from Leone. For 
example, Worley v. Waddell263 demonstrates the logical and 
constitutional infirmity of the purported principle that no fundamental 
rights are involved in the right that the government recognize one’s 
common law name.264   Because Worley, through no fault of his own, had 
inconsistent names on his birth certificate and file with the SSA, he could 
not receive a driver’s license.  The facts are compelling:  
Plaintiff . . . was born to an unwed mother . . . in July 1968. 
His birth certificate issued at the time identified him as 
“Joseph Alan Ivey.” In 1969, Plaintiff’s mother married his 
biological father and . . . [registered him with the Social 
                                                                                                                     
 259. Id. at 1254–55 (citations omitted). 
 260. Id. at 1255. 
 261. Id. 
 262. 1991 WL 55457, at *6 (10th Cir. 1991) (McKay, J., dissenting) (“Moreover, Utah law 
requires applicants to use their ‘legal name.’ The appellant’s ‘legal name’ may very well be her 
maiden name. (No one has proved the contrary.) But the Driver License Division will not allow 
her to use it. I believe this is irrational.”). 
 263. 819 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Ind. 2011). 
 264. Id. at 830. 
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Security Administration] under the name “Joseph A. 
Worley,” which is the name he has used ever since. [And, 
thus, “Joseph A. Worley” is a common law name.  Worley] 
has repeatedly applied to the Indiana Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles (“BMV”) for a photo ID or driver’s license that 
would enable him to vote, to obtain a marriage license, 
legally change his name, and/or proceed with the adoption 
of his child. The BMV has denied his successive 
applications, however, because the name associated with his 
social security number does not match the name on his birth 
certificate. The Social Security Administration has also 
refused to issue Plaintiff a new card due to his lack of a state-
issued photo ID.265  
The court ruled in favor of Worley. Conceding that under Leone there is 
no fundamental right to demand a government-issued identification, the 
court stated that individuals have a fundamental right to do all the things 
that require government-issued identification,266 which, as this Article 
shows, is pretty much everything.  
But did the court simply defend the fundamental rights to marry, 
travel, and vote? It would seem that there is a strong logical implication 
that the Waddell court actually vindicated a right to name oneself, i.e., to 
marry, travel, and vote under a common law name. While the court said 
it was simply allowing Waddell an identity, the court vindicated the 
identity that Waddell chose—his common law name. Would the court 
have ordered the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) to give 
Worley a driver’s license that said “Joseph Alan Ivey”—a name that was 
his “legal” name on his birth certificate but which he disclaimed?  
In other words, one could read this case as arguing that the 
government cannot deny individuals an identity—and that is it. But, if 
one would be uncomfortable resolving the matter by issuing a mandamus 
order to the Indiana BMV to issue a driver’s license in the name of 
“Joseph Alan Ivey,” then the court’s holding cannot be so simple. Rather, 
the logical conclusion is that there is some basic right in naming oneself. 
Or, at least, if the common law name right means anything, it must entail 
some obligation of the government to recognize the individual’s name of 
choice. 
C.  First Amendment Rights to Government Recognition of Common 
Law Names 
Beyond the conceptual problem of whether the government can, in 
effect, tell people what to call themselves, the First Amendment also 
protects a right to demand that the government recognize a common law 
                                                                                                                     
 265. Id. at 827–28 (citations omitted). 
 266. Id. at 830.  
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name. However, the First Amendment analysis is strangely bifurcated. In 
the penal context, courts have found a fundamental right to call oneself 
what one wishes.267 Many courts have ordered prison authorities to use 
and recognize common law names—at least names for which there is no 
formally recognized name change. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit ruled, “[t]he adoption of Muslim names by inmates 
practicing that religion is generally recognized to be an exercise of both 
first amendment speech and religious freedom.”268 In other words, in the 
prison context, some courts have recognized a First Amendment right to 
make the government recognize one’s common law name. In contrast, 
members of the public generally do not have a fundamental right to have 
the government recognize or record chosen names, as the Leone case 
discussed above suggests.  
The First Amendment right to force the government to recognize 
one’s common law name while incarcerated is often limited because full 
enjoyment of that right is “inconsistent with [prisoners’] status 
[in] . . . the corrections system.”269 Courts consequently have placed 
restrictions on the ability of inmates to change their names. Circuit courts 
differ on the degree to which the religious or common law right is 
recognized by correctional institutions, with some, such as the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, being broad270 and others, such as the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, being quite limited.271  
For instance, some courts have required prisons to use “a/k/a” for 
prisoners.272 Other courts have required inmates to use formal name 
change procedures.273 These disparities result in part from the change in 
                                                                                                                     
 267. See, e.g., Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517, 518 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the First 
Amendment protects an inmate’s use of a religious name). 
 268. Id. Many courts have ruled that an inmate has a First Amendment interest in using his 
religious name, at least in conjunction with his committed name. E.g., Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 
F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1990); Barrett v. Virginia, 689 F.2d 498, 502 (4th Cir. 1982); Fawaad 
v. Herring, 874 F. Supp. 350, 352 (N.D. Ala. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Fawaad v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084 
(11th Cir. 1996). Some courts only consider whether a name was adopted for religious reasons 
and do not consider whether the name would be protected for expressive reasons. See Ali v. 
Stickman, 206 F. App’x 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 269. Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 591 F. Supp. 353, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).  
 270. E.g., Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that “prisons are 
required to take simple measures to accommodate prisoners’ First Amendment rights”). 
 271. See, e.g., Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524, 526–27 (7th Cir. 2013); Azeez v. 
Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1298–99, 1302 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 272. E.g., Felix, 833 F.2d at 519. 
 273. See, e.g., Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1175 (8th Cir. 1990) (“The policy of the 
Department of Corrections with respect to its records thus far exceeds in its scope the 
administrative interests recognized by state law. The a/k/a alternative which permits continued 
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Supreme Court precedent, which limited a once-broader protection of 
prisoners’ constitutional rights.274 
Azeez v. Fairman275 reflects a parsimonious take on a prisoner’s right 
to a common law name.276 Abdullah Muhammad sought to have the 
prison’s records changed to reflect his common law name.277 He argued 
that as Illinois recognizes common law names, the Department of 
Corrections must reflect his common law name in official records.278 The 
Department of Corrections refused to recognize the plaintiff’s name.279  
Judge Richard Posner sided with the Department of Corrections.280 He 
reasoned that because naming is not a fundamental right, the state may 
reasonably require a formal name change to alter his records.281 His 
reasoning was in keeping with the cost–benefit analysis characteristic to 
his jurisprudence.282 He asserted that a name change’s cost to the 
Department of Corrections was significant.283 He envisioned the wardens 
being constantly bombarded with name change requests.284 
Judge Posner’s analysis would have an interesting application to non-
imprisoned individuals. In contrast to imprisoned individuals, non-
imprisoned individuals have no diminishment of rights, and there are no 
prison wardens to be bombarded with notices of name changes.  Thus, 
the benefits seem greater and the costs significantly less. The balance 
would seem to tip in the favor of common law rights. Importantly, cases 
such as Leone do not even engage in such balancing. 
 
                                                                                                                     
use of committed names in prison records as Arkansas requires demonstrates the 
unreasonableness of the current practice.”). 
 274. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (“In none of these four ‘prisoners’ rights’ 
cases did the Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny, but instead inquired whether a prison 
regulation that burdens fundamental rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological 
objectives, or whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those concerns.”). 
 275. 795 F.2d 1296 (1986). 
 276. See id. at 1296, 1298–99, 1302. 
 277. Id. at 1297. The named plaintiff, Azeez had  legally changed his name.  Muhammad 
was a co-plaintiff and simply adopted a new name after his conversion to Islam. Id.  
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. at 1298.  
 280. Id. at 1302. 
 281. Id. at 1299.  
 282. See id. at 1298–99, 1301. 
 283. Id. at 1298. 
 284. Id. at 1298–99; see also Rahman v. Stephenson, 626 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Tenn. 
1986) (“The Salahuddin case is precisely on point, and its reasoning is compelling.”); Salahuddin 
v. Coughlin, 591 F. Supp. 353, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Common-law name change, even for 
religious purposes, is among the rights that plaintiffs lost as ‘inconsistent with their status as 
prisoner[s] of the corrections system.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 
817, 822 (1974))). 
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D.  The First Amendment, Intermediate Scrutiny, and Government-
Issued Identification 
Assume arguendo that the First Amendment implies some level of 
scrutiny for government refusal to provide identification under a common 
law name. Concededly, no court has so ruled outside of the prison 
context. On the other hand, the few cases that have touched on the matter 
failed to address the prison cases. More importantly, the strange 
inconsistencies of the Waddell case show that government-issued 
identification certainly can implicate fundamental rights.285  
That there should be some First Amendment right to demand 
identification in one’s common law name seems evident from this 
Article’s analysis. Government-issued identification plays an inescapable 
role in determining the name that individuals must use in banking, 
business, and healthcare—virtually all aspects of life. If one retains a 
meaningful right to use whatever names one wishes, one must have the 
right, at least in some circumstances, to have government-issued 
pseudonymous identification. 
So assume there is some First Amendment requirement to have the 
government issue an individual identification under a common law name. 
As such, courts should review restrictions on government-issued 
identification under First Amendment intermediate scrutiny. This level of 
judicial scrutiny is appropriate for content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restrictions. Requiring REAL ID-conforming identification is a 
classic content-neutral regulation because it prohibits all types of names, 
not certain types with an objectionable content. Such a requirement is, in 
a way, a time, place, and manner restriction. Most of the time, individuals 
can call themselves whatever they wish but may not do so when they 
travel, go to the doctor, buy a bottle of wine, or open a bank account. 
A government law or regulation will satisfy intermediate scrutiny if 
“it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”286 This 
inquiry leads to the question set forth above, central to this Article. What 
is the governmental interest in a pervasive identification regime? Again, 
given that the United States survived for so long without one, it is hard to 
see what one might be. While there is certainly a governmental interest 
in establishing identities in certain contexts, such as government benefits 
and airports and border crossings, this does not imply an interest in a 
comprehensive regime.  
                                                                                                                     
 285. See supra Section III.B.  
 286. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).  
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On this point, it is interesting to look at the stated purpose of the REAL 
ID Act. The REAL ID Act has a stated “official purpose” that “includes 
but is not limited to accessing Federal facilities, boarding federally 
regulated commercial aircraft, entering nuclear power plants, and any 
other purposes that the Secretary shall determine.”287 In its implementing 
regulations, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) accepted those 
purposes and did not add any.288 Even the linchpin of the current 
identification regime does not claim to be a comprehensive identification 
regime.  
The issue of purpose leads to the second part of the intermediate 
scrutiny analysis: the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment 
freedoms must be no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest. If one disaggregates the governmental interests from a 
generalized universal identification regime into distinct instances where 
the government has an interest in identity, then less restrictive approaches 
become apparent. Consider the governmental interest in preventing fraud 
in benefits. Here, common law or pseudonymous names can reasonably 
be restricted in the obtaining of benefits. Unique identification cards 
should be issued for social security benefits, Medicare, Medicaid, and all 
other government benefits. However, these identities could be specific to 
the government program. Individuals could establish identity using their 
“real names” but then use pseudonyms for receiving government benefits, 
once they established identity. While the government may have records 
cross-referencing identities, these need be neither public nor shared with 
other parts of the government. European governments and Australia are 
experimenting with this approach.289 
In addition, the government has an interest in security. Border control 
and airplane traffic are areas where the government has a legitimate 
interest in establishing identity. Again, one could establish a 
pseudonymous identity for the purpose of obtaining a passport. 
Alternatively, as Jim Harper has argued, private entities could take on the 
job of identification.290 Indeed, they already have.291 For instance, 
ClearMe identification is currently used at major airports throughout the 
                                                                                                                     
 287. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 201(3), 119 Stat. 302, 312 (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note (Improved Security for Drivers’ Licenses and Personal 
Identification Cards)). 
 288. Minimum Standard for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by 
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272, 5277 (Jan. 29, 2008). 
 289. Vandezande, supra note 16, at 12; OFF. OF THE AUSTRALIAN INFO. COMM’R, 
AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY PRINCIPLE GUIDELINES: PRIVACY ACT 1988, ch. 2, at 2 (2014), 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/resources/agencies-and-organisations/app-guidelines/APP_guidelines_ 
complete_version_1_April_2015.pdf. 
 290. HARPER, supra note 34, at 244–45.  
 291. Id. 
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United States.292 It is a private firm that contracts with airports to provide 
security.293 Individuals pay for the service, which offers expedited 
security.294 To receive the service, individuals give their fingerprints and 
retina scans to ClearMe, which then clears the individuals with the 
Transportation Security Administration.295 These biometric identifiers 
provide easy transit through security.296 But, the trick is that ClearMe 
contractually obligates itself to reimburse individuals against any privacy 
breaches; yet there is no reason why ClearMe could not issue its 
identification under a pseudonym as it relies on biometric markers.297 
IV.  WHAT’S IN A NAME? A THEORETICAL ANSWER 
This Article describes a dramatic shift in the law of the name—from 
common law to a comprehensive identification regime under the REAL 
ID Act. This transformation presents the question: what is the legal status 
of a personal name? Despite the vast literature on intellectual property 
interests in a name, there is no comparable scholarship on personal 
names. For instance, a trademark is like property. It belongs to the entity 
who uses it or to whom it has been legally transferred.298 Businesses can 
receive court injunctions to prevent others from using it, just as one could 
receive an injunction for someone presenting a nuisance to real property. 
But, what about personal names? 
Professors Calabresi and Melamed’s landmark article299 created the 
standard theoretical model for understanding property and liability rules, 
                                                                                                                     
 292. See Where Is Clear?, CLEARME, http://www.clearme.com/where-is-clear (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2015) (describing ClearMe as currently available at twelve U.S. airports). 
 293. HARPER, supra note 34, at 235.  
 294. Id. at 235–36. 
 295. Id. at 235. 
 296. Id. at 235–36.  
 297. Id. 
 298. 3 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE, & 
MONOPOLIES (“But the incorporeal nature of a trademark tends to obscure its substantiality. 
Property is a multifaceted and evasive term, more philosophical than legal in meaning and extent. 
In legal parlance it connotes the right to exclude others from any use, or from disturbing the 
owner's use, thereof. The right of a trademark owner with respect to his mark is (or should be) the 
right to be protected with respect to all three functions, i.e., as an indication of the common origin 
of all products and services offered under the mark.”). 
 299. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31; see also Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The 
Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2175 (1997) (“One View of the Cathedral is now so much a part 
of the legal canon that it is widely known simply by the joined names of its two authors, ‘Calabresi 
and Melamed.’ In turn, ‘Calabresi and Melamed’ has become a shorthand name for the article’s 
most famous legacy: the distinction between ‘property rules’ and ‘liability rules’ as means of 
protecting entitlements.” (footnote omitted)).  
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which “represent alternatives for enforcing a legal entitlement.”300 
Property rules govern entitlements that require consensual access.301 
Outsiders cannot enter private property without the owner’s consent; if 
they do, the owner can get an injunction from a court.302 Or, the owner 
may elect to charge outsiders for the privilege.303 In contrast, liability 
allows for nonconsensual access and requires an objective payment.304 
Anyone may publicly perform a copyrighted song without the copyright 
holder’s permission, provided that they pay an established licensing fee. 
Or, similarly, risky drivers may crash into other drivers and interfere with 
their entitlement to have an undamaged car, provided the risky driver is 
willing to pay objective damages in tort.  
The common law naming system was a liability regime. Anyone could 
use any name provided that they did not use it fraudulently. A person was 
free to call herself whatever she wanted, just as she was free to play a 
copyrighted song or drive on the street, provided she paid for any 
damages she caused. 
In contrast, the current system seems more like a property regime, 
with the state owning all names. Individuals receive a “license” to use 
officially recognized names, i.e., the one on their REAL ID. In most 
important aspects of life, individuals cannot use any other name because, 
in effect, the government owns them. Individuals can petition to receive 
a new name via the formal name changing process, but no one may obtain 
a name outside of this process—or possess two names. Without indulging 
in paranoia, the current naming regime numbers individuals for the 
convenience of the state. They become objects of data, who are not 
permitted to change, to use a computer term, the “string” that identifies 
them.  
Professors Calabresi and Melamed famously argued that transaction 
costs should determine whether to use a property or liability regime.305 
“The conventional approach that emerged from Calabresi and Melamed’s 
classic article is that courts should rely on liability rules when transaction 
costs are sufficiently high that the relevant parties will not be able to reach 
a consensual arrangement for access to the resource in question.”306  
                                                                                                                     
 300. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786 (2007). 
 301. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 31, at 1105.  
 302. Id.  
 303. See id. at 1107. 
 304. See id. at 1105–06. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Lemley & Weiser, supra note 300, at 786. This conclusion is often highly debated. See, 
e.g., Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Correlated Values in the Theory of Property and Liability 
Rules, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 135–36 (2003) (showing that liability rules, if based on average 
expected harm, conditional on the actual value of harm, can be more efficient than property rules); 
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Trademark law and common law naming systems offer a nice 
illustration of the choice between property and liability rules. Under 
trademark, a company “owns” its name. It can enjoin others who use it, 
and no one can use it without the company’s permission.307 Presumably, 
legislators and courts believed that the transaction costs of a business 
assuring that no one else use its name were sufficiently low, so the 
trademark property rules emerged. 
In contrast, anyone can use a common law name provided she pays 
for any damages she causes via fraud. Presumably, in the early days of 
the common law, the transaction costs of giving property rights to names 
of millions of people were too great.  Indeed, a property rule never 
seemed necessary because in most transactions, one did not need absolute 
assurance of identity. Rather, there is a sliding scale. Consumer 
transactions, medical treatment, bank accounts, secured interests, 
contracts, and loans all undoubtedly require a level of certainty of 
identity. The common law’s liability regime allowed for enough certainty 
as needed without the great cost of a property regime. 
Interestingly, due to computers and information technology, the cost 
of a naming system for all individuals is no longer so great, and the 
government has incurred the cost of building such a system. Personal 
names could be treated as trademarks. Individuals could own their name, 
and others cannot infringe upon it. Individuals could “buy” names from 
others or license others. The state would stay out. Of course, such a 
treatment would allow for pseudonymity. 
But, even as technology has lowered transaction costs, making a 
property regime in names possible and even a market in names possible, 
government undermines such a market by in effect cornering it. The 
government has de facto ownership of all names and will not transfer 
them—unless one jumps through its hoops via a formal name change. A 
person can only have one name at a time. To use a name without the 
government’s consent would be a crime as elaborated above.308  
From a Calabresi–Melamed perspective, what is the advantage of this 
arrangement? Perhaps there is no advantage for individuals, and the 
federal government’s gradual takeover of the identity field constitutes a 
governmental decision to end a “market” in names. As Judge Posner 
famously said, “When transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually 
                                                                                                                     
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2002) 
(arguing for a combination of property and liability); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property 
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1996) 
(presenting a model in which liability rules based on average expected harm are more efficient 
than property rules). 
 307. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114–16 (2012).  
 308. See supra Part II. 
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by definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources.”309 
Criminal law constitutes an inherently “inefficient” “coercive transfer” 
that bypasses the market’s voluntary exchange.310 Criminal law exists to 
“discourag[e] market bypassing.”311 
Why would the government outlaw an efficient market in names when 
such a move would frustrate the often legitimate desires of individuals to 
have different names? The reason, in part, for ending the market in names 
proceeds from fear of terrorism, which as discussed above, prompted the 
passage of the REAL ID Act. And, to some degree, the end of the name 
market is a logical outgrowth of the welfare state, which for decades had 
been gradually accreting even more precise records of the citizenry. As 
this Article shows, the government finds it easier to distribute benefits 
and keep track of people if no market in names exists. Citizens are placed 
in easy-to-use filing cabinets—or computerized databases. But there is a 
cost. Many people want privacy for legitimate reasons. Further, Patterson 
illustrates that the government is not always above using identification to 
persecute political and religious dissenters.312 The purpose of this Article 
is not to come down one way or the other on this basic political trade-off. 
Rather, it attempts to uncover the largely ignored legal mechanisms that 
have affected this trade-off and how these legal mechanisms can frustrate 
or further privacy.   
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates how a quietly growing body of law and 
regulation, which requires government-recorded name identification in 
virtually every aspect of life, constitutes a major privacy threat. This web 
of law and regulation threatens to render the Constitution’s anonymity 
protection against compelled identity disclosure a de facto nullity.  
This Article proposes that pseudonymity, as guaranteed by common 
law and the First Amendment, could offer privacy against this 
identification regime. This Article analyzes the yet nascent case law 
involving individuals’ rights to demand government-issued identification 
under a pseudonymous common law name. Building on the principles of 
the common law name and the First Amendment, this Article concludes 
that under certain circumstances, individuals have the right to a 
pseudonymous government-issued identification. Beyond the practical 
implication of this insight, this Article engages in a theoretical analysis 
                                                                                                                     
 309. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1195 (1985). 
 310. Id. at 1195–96; see also Claire Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 895, 900 (2000) (“Posner argues that crimes are acts that are necessarily inefficient because 
they involve bypassing a voluntary market.”). 
 311. Posner, supra note 309, at 1196. 
 312. 357 U.S. 449, 451, 466 (1958).  
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of personal names. It describes the silent shift from the common law 
liability regime to the current government-owned property regime and 
shows how this shift reflects major change in the relationship between 
the state and citizen. 
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